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EVOLVING EQUALITY: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE BAR
MICHAEL

A. NEWTON*

Defense counsel in international criminal proceedings face difficult
challenges that are intrinsic to the modern system of internationalized
accountability;yet their professionalismand performance representperhaps
the most determinative dimensionfor evaluating the overallfairness of what
the world terms 'justice" for grievous atrocities. Defense teams labor
against the tides of public opinion and the deeply felt pain of the victims of
mass atrocities. Abandonment of appropriate defense efforts, whether the
result of professional fecklessness or personal pressures, would transform
international criminal law into an organized sham aimed at achieving a
shadow of justice while undermining the rights of the individuals unlucky
enough to face charges against the combined weight ofpolitical andjudicial
will. Since its genesis in the wake of World War II, the growth of a modern
field termed international criminal law is necessarily paralleled by the
development ofa mature defense role that helps ensure that every defendant's
culpability or innocence is grounded in the soil of individual responsibility
rather than irrational prejudice or irresponsible collective guilt. The
developmental arc of the internationaldefense bar in its organizationaland
systematic context has, however, been surprisingly underexplored.
This article discusses the jurisprudence associated with the precept of
equality of arms between the prosecution and defense. Highlightingthe key
challenges encountered by the defense that impair perfect equality of arms,
this article will describe the organizationalresponses in modern practice.
This article documents the empirical indicators supporting the assertion that
defendants receive assistance from an organized and mature defense bar,
despite its imperfections and occasionalinadequacies. The holistic system of
internationalcriminaljustice provides rough proceduralparity to the defense,
despite the recurring ethical dilemmas highlighted herein. This article
* Professor of the Practice of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. For contact information see
http://law.vanderbilt.edu/newton. The author would like to thank the following individuals whose
comments and critiques improved the earlier draft of this article during the International Legal Studies
Roundtable held at Vanderbilt University Law School: Michael J. Kelly, Fabrizio Marella, Jacob
Cogan, Kristen Boon, Daniel Bradlow, Michael Scharf, Mark Ellis, David Gartner, William Aceves,
Kenneth Anderson, Ingrid Wuerth, and Gregory A. Fox. The inevitable errors, omissions, and
oversights of this essay are solely my own responsibility. The Central Intelligence Agency provided
research assistance to support this project.
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concludes, perhaps controversially, that while a perfect equality of arms is a
structural impossibility in the modern system of internationaljustice, the
modern defense bar has evolved to provide itsfunctional equivalent.
.........................................................
I. INTRODUCTION
II. EQUALITY OF ARMS-THE ESTABLISHMENT AND ETHOS OF THE
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Defense counsel in international criminal proceedings face extremely
difficult challenges that are intrinsic to the modem systems of internationalized
accountability; yet their professionalism and performance represent perhaps the
most determinative dimension for evaluating the overall fairness of what is
commonly considered "justice" for grievous atrocities. Even a cursory glance at
international criminal tribunal judgments of the past fifteen years illustrates the
inherent factual and legal complexity of the cases at bar. Of course, academics and
observers can never overlook the reality that the various prosecution teams always
bear the responsibility for proving every element of the charged offenses beyond a
reasonable doubt, including the modes of personal liability alleged and any facts
indispensable to a conviction.' This is the very essence of the frequent refrain that
"ending impunity" is a critical component for the future of a multilateral and
The developed system of
integrated international system of justice.
internationalized justice exists to provide viable forums for achieving actual justice

I Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR 01-72-T, Trial Chamber Judgement, T30 (Dec. 2, 2008).

2011

The Development of the InternationalDefense Bar

381

in lieu of the pretense of preordained process, and the defense is therefore an
indispensable aspect of the modem system. The prosecutor bears the public
challenge of presenting a transparent process that facilitates the widespread
perception of justice that is integral to the "expressive value" of the trial, which is
an altogether different task from the reality inside the courtroom2 Conversely, the
defense bar is responsible for marshalling the materials and evidentiary challenges
to ensure the integrity of the process in the face of often intimidating barriers.
In one sense, the casual reader might object to the title of this article with
the pertinent observation that there is no monolithic defense bar as such in
international practice or by extension in the hybrid and internationalized tribunals
that operate within the domestic justice systems in post-conflict settings. The
mixture of personalities, practices, and procedures does indeed vary from The
Hague to Arusha to Phnom Penh and across accountability mechanisms.
Nevertheless, this article postulates that there is indeed an identifiable body of
modern practice and precedent that in the aggregate forms a modem defense bar
that is comparable to the prosecution in terms of its overall capabilities. Phrased
another way, the development of a modern professional ethos that suffuses through
defense efforts in every extant tribunal, combined with the overarching body of
norms and recognized organizational best practices that assist the defense, has led
to a functional equality of arms. It is no accident that there is a core of defense
attorneys that are highly skilled in the particularities of international criminal law
that can float comfortably across continents and jurisdictions, even when their
defense teams are integrated efforts with augmentation by local attorneys. The
modern international defense bar is a mature and competent entity that can be
expected to provide a vigorous defense anywhere in the world that seeks to
establish an accountability mechanism for the foreseeable future. This is a
remarkable evolution over the past six decades, and this article will describe the
metrics that warrant this conclusion and the organizational innovations that
demonstrate this developmental arc.
Defense teams often labor against the tides of public opinion and the
deeply felt pain of the victims of mass atrocities. If commentators candidly
acknowledged the conversations in families around the world affected by mass
atrocities, they would accept the truism that the scale of human suffering and
societal devastation that fill the cases generates a virulent yearning for retribution,
or even revenge, in its starkest form. However, thoughtful modernists are aware
that a quest for revenge on a personal or societal level is unseemly and likely
counterproductive to lasting peace. In the context of the domestic Tribunal
established to prosecute the Ba'athist leaders responsible for widespread human
degradation and two decades of atrocities in Iraq, a distinguished Iraqi jurist
unconsciously echoed Justice Robert Jackson's aspiration for the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) by indignantly noting "I am a judge, not a
murderer." 4 Our moral compass would be troubled if we readily accepted a degree
A. DRUMBL,

2

MARK

3

See Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis ofInternational Criminal Law, 21 LEIDEN J. INT'L L.

ATROcITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

179 (2007).

925, 929 (2008) (noting the tension between emotive demands to seek redress for victims of
widespread atrocity crimes and the due process rights of the defendants).
4 Author's personal notes from discussion with unnamed Iraqi judge, Baghdad Convention
Center (Dec. 2002).
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of pleasure from deliberate infliction of human suffering, even if we deemed it to be
well-deserved. The process of an orderly and public trial can, however, help shape
public opinion and moderate the desire for retribution, and the efforts of a
professionalized and prepared defense bar are the irreplaceable component of an
orderly system that avoids what one distinguished scholar termed "Potemkin
Justice."s
As the International Criminal Court (ICC) was taking form and coming
into actuality in early 2003, the International Criminal Bar promulgated a sample
Code of Conduct to inform the set of ethical standards for counsel that would be
developed by the Court. The cornerstone of the ethical edifice was the clear
recognition that the "system of international justice based on the Rule of Law rests
on three pillars: an independent judiciary, an independent prosecutor and an
independent legal profession."6 The independence, ethical excellence, and fearless
representation of the defense lawyers must remain an indispensable element of
authentic enforcement efforts. Indeed, the abandonment of appropriate efforts on
behalf of defendants' facing trials in the international criminal justice system,
whether the result of professional fecklessness or personal pressures, would
transform those proceedings into an organized sham capable of achieving only a
shadow of justice while undermining the core human rights of those who will face
charges under its authority.
When given a copy of his indictment before the IMT, Herman Garing
penned the phrase "[t]he victor will always be the judge and the vanquished the

s

M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,

INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 703 (2003)

(referring to the outwardly model illusion of a meaningless and hollow reality).
6 CODE OF CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL BAR,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ETHICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL BAR (2003) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL BAR CODE] (copy on file with author).

For the sake of consistency and ease, this article will use the term "defendant" rather than
"alleged perpetrator" or "accused" or "charged individual." There was extensive debate during the
drafting of the Elements of Crimes for the International Criminal Court over the relative merits of the
terms "perpetrator" or "accused." Though some delegations were concerned that the term perpetrator
would undermine the presumption of innocence, the delegates to the Preparatory Commission
(PrepCom) ultimately agreed to use the former in the Elements after including a comment in the
introductory chapeau that "the term 'perpetrator' is neutral as to guilt or innocence." Rep. of the Prep.
Comm'n for the Int'l Crim. Court, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000), in KNOT
DORMANN ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 14 (2002).

While some readers may be surprised that there could be such divergent views about the
fairness of the international criminal proceedings, it is important to keep in mind that every major war
crimes trial in history has had both outspoken supporters and voracious critics. Indeed, at the
conclusion of the Nuremberg trial, two U.S. Supreme Court Justices publicly castigated the proceedings
"as a high grade lynching party," and as a "retroactive jurisprudence that would surely be
unconstitutional in an American court." MICHAEL A. NEWTON AND MICHAEL P. SCHARF, ENEMY OF
THE STATE: THE TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN 211 (2008). Ten days prior to the

execution of the convicted Nazi leaders in Nuremberg, Senator Robert A. Taft caused a firestorm of
public debate with a public address that became a flashpoint in the campaign for President. He opined
that
About this whole judgment there is the spirit of vengeance, and vengeance is seldom justice. The
hanging of the eleven men convicted will be a blot on the American record which we shall long
regret. In these trials, we have accepted the Russian idea of the purpose of trials-govemment
policy and not justice-with little relation to Anglo-Saxon heritage. By clothing policy in the form
of legal procedure, we may discredit the whole idea of justice in Europe for years to come.
JOHN F. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE, THE ILLUSTRATED EDITION 218-19 (1984).
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accused" across its cover.9 The Allied Nations suffered terribly during the war, but
the Russian jurists represented a system that murdered millions of Stalinist
opponents and hence had no greater moral authority than Nazi Germany itself.'o
Since allegations of so-called "victor's justice" have haunted virtually every
accountability process since Nuremberg," there is a visceral power in their
invocation that could corrode every facet of the trial. In purely legalistic terms,
authentic justice must be the product of an "impartial and regularly constituted
court respecting the generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure." 2
If the truth seeking process of trials is overcome by externally imposed limits on
judicial independence or politically motivated revenge, the entire process would
suffer from a crisis of perceived illegitimacy. Notwithstanding the interposition of
an independent judiciary, defense attorneys stand between their clients and the raw
political whims of powerful states that organize and fund the system of modem
international criminal justice. They accordingly have an essential role in ensuring
both the fairness of proceedings and the perception of that fairness.
Quite apart from its legal firsts," the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg presaged the inauguration of the holistic system of principles and
practices that we today term "international criminal law." Perhaps the most potent
aspect of the Nuremberg legacy is the truism that authentic justice is not achieved
on the wings of societal vengeance, innuendo, or external manipulation; rather, the
very essence of a fair trial is a verdict based on regularized process and on the
quantum of evidence against an individual defendant introduced in open court. The
entire concept of what we now recognize as the field of "international criminal law"
has been described as "the gradual transposition to the international level of rules
and legal constructs proper to national criminal law or national trial proceedings." 4
While the theoretical purpose of an international accountability mechanism is to
reshape the historical narrative amongst the victims of the horrific crimes and the
societies affected by those crimes, that macro objective cannot be met without the
micro efforts of the defense bar to challenge the minutiae of evidence and viva voce
testimony during the often tedious and lengthy days of trial. The growth of a
For another articulation of this highly
9 JOSEPH E. PERSICO, INFAMY ON TRIAL 83 (1994).
debatable proposition, see generally RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTOR'S JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR
CRIMES TRIAL (1971).
'o Christian Tomuschat, The Legacy ofNuremberg, 4 J. OF INT'L CRIM. JUST. 830, 834 (2006).
1 Richard May & Marieka Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg,
Tokyo, The Hague, and Arusha, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 725, 764 (1999). The perception of
victor's justice was also a strong motivating factor in the movement to establish a permanent
international criminal court. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Time Has Come for an International
Criminal Court, I IND. INT'L & COMP L. REV. 1, 34 (1991),
(We cannot rely on the sporadic episodes of the victorious prosecuting the defeated and then dismantle
these ad hoc structures as we did with the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. The permanency of an
international criminal tribunal acting impartially and fairly irrespective of whom the accused may be is
the best policy for the advancement of the international rule of law and for the prevention and control
of international and transnational criminality.).
12 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 75 (4), June 8, 1977
[hereinafter Additional Protocol 1].
See generally Henry T. King, Robert Jackson and the Triumph of Justice at Nuremberg, 35
CASE WES. RES. J. INT'L L. 263 (2003). To be clear, the defense practices in the Tokyo Tribunals
faced equally difficult hurdles in terms of the sheer enormity of collecting evidence and challenging the
perception that the verdicts were a fait accompli even as opening statements began.
14 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 18 (2003).
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systematic justice system is necessarily paralleled by the development of a mature
defense bar that serves to ensure that every judgment is grounded in the soil of
individual responsibility rather than irrational prejudice or irresponsible collective
guilt. In a very real sense, the aspiration of the entire accountability enterprise as a
constructive component of lasting peace relies on the efforts of the bar in making
vigorous and viable efforts to protect the basic rights of defendants.
Against the realities noted above, this article will document the
development of a modem defense bar in the context of international and
internationalized prosecutions. Acquittal rates are easily identified," but these
figures do not reveal the true efforts and professionalism (or lack thereof) of the
defense teams. The actual performance of the defense bar in international criminal
trials has been underexplored in the literature. The developmental arc of the
international defense bar has been all but ignored in the literature despite its
centrality to the overall effort to achieve "justice" for egregious international
offenses. This article will describe that maturation based upon a synergistic
consideration of the current jurisprudence, the words of defense counsel, and the
available literature. The next part of this article will discuss the jurisprudence
associated with the basic right of defendants in the international justice system to
equality of arms in the preparation and presentation of their defense. Parts III and
IV respectively will explore some of the key challenges encountered by the
defenses that impair the pursuit of perfect equality of arms and discuss the
organizational responses to those challenges.
As the U.S. Supreme Court noted, we do not live in a perfect world, and a
criminal "defendant is not entitled to a perfect trial, just a fair one."" The system of
international criminal justice has evolved significantly in the past decade to
facilitate a zealous and independent defense bar and to discipline advocates who
violate the established bounds of appropriate conduct. After discussing the
challenges faced by the defense and the organizational improvements made by
internationalized and ad hoc tribunals, this article will review the empirical
evidence supporting the assertion that defendants in fact receive high quality
defense efforts even in the face of complex legal theories and extraordinarily
difficult factual contexts. The ad hoc international tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) necessarily provide the bulk of the
empirical data because their case law is far more extensive and supported by an
extensive and publicly available motions practice. The ad hoc tribunals also
provided the baseline from which organizational responses to the maturing defense
bar can be measured. However, the internationalized tribunals (the Special Court
for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT), Special Panels in East
Timor, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) also
provide important indicators of a mature defense bar because they represent a
1 For example, the Special Court for Sierra Leone has a 100% conviction rate at present, while
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda approximates an 85% rate, and has seen several
convictions at the Trial level overturned on appeal. The Special Panels in the Dili District Court in East
Timor acquitted only one defendant after a contested trial, although two others were found not guilty at
trial as the charges were plainly based on insufficient evidence and even the prosecution sought to
withdraw charges. U.N. Secretary-General, End of the Mandate Report of the Secretary General of the
United Nations Mission ofSupport in East Timor, 1 20, U.N. Doc. S/2005/310 (May 12, 2005).

" Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) (quoting Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S.
604, 619 (1953)).
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synthesis of international norms into a sui generis system. Phrased another way,
arising from the almost overnight creation of the defense teams that challenged the
Allied evidence at Nuremberg, the modern international criminal defense bar is now
mature and effective, despite its imperfections and occasional inadequacies. This
article will conclude, perhaps controversially, that while a perfect equality of arms
is a structural impossibility in the current system of international justice, the
modern defense bar has nevertheless evolved to provide defendants with trial
procedures and organizational support necessary to fully preserve their due process
rights.
II.

EQUALITY OF ARMS-THE ESTABLISHMENT AND ETHOS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

A. The Theory

The right of every criminal defendant to adequate time and facilities in the
preparation of a vigorous defense represents the quintessential expression of a
systematic commitment to balance the ends of justice." The orchestration of
international political will and sustained funding to seek individual criminal
accountability cannot in itself warrant convictions flowing from fundamentally
tainted proceedings. In the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, for example, the
Milogevi6 regime exercised power over the Yugoslav judicial system sufficient to
prevent any potential accountability for the widespread violations of international
law committed under its auspices. Thus, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations concluded that the "particular circumstances" of impunity in the former
Yugoslavia warranted the creation of the international tribunal" and the ICTY was
borne from this political mandate. The Secretary-General's Report nevertheless
made clear that it is "axiomatic that the International Tribunal must fully respect
internationally recognized standards regarding the rights of the accused at all stages
of the proceedings." In the view of the Secretary-General, such internationally
recognized standards are, in particular, contained in Article 14 of the International

17 Human Rights Comm., Zwaan-de Vries v. the Netherlands, Comm. No. 182/1984, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/29/D/182/1984 (1987); Ofrer v. Austria, App. No. 524/59, 6 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 680
(Eur. Ct. H.R.) ("equality of arms"). As U.S. Supreme Court Justice George Sutherland observed in

Powell v. Alabama:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be
heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law . . .. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know
how to establish his innocence.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
18 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security

Council Resolution 808, 1 26, U.N. Doc. S/2-5704 (May 19, 1993). Similarly, Robert Jackson
understood the iconic nature of the International Military Tribunal perhaps more clearly than any of his
peers, but also believed that the prosecutions were a pragmatic necessity in defeating what he termed at
the time "unregenerate and virulent" Nazism. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER'S
PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 170-71 (John Q. Barrett ed., 2003).
'9 Id. T 106 (emphasis added).
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." 20
The indispensable right of each defendant to have adequate time and
facilities for the preparation of the defense case and to communicate with counsel
flows from the requirement of Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) that a criminal trial be a "fair and public hearing by a
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.''2 The right to a
fair criminal trial that offers "the essential guarantees of independence and
impartiality"" untainted by executive interference or external manipulation reflects
the very essence of human rights norms and is replicated in the laws and customs of
war addressing military prosecutions of civilians.23 As a logical extension, the law
applicable to international armed conflicts requires trial before an "impartial and
regularly constituted court respecting the generally recognized principles of regular
judicial procedure ....
Judicial processes, derived from the political support and ample funding of
the most powerful states in the world as a response to criminal activity for which
there appeared no other salient solution, immediately raised the specter of victor's
justice that lay dormant for nearly fifty years following the IMT. Speaking early in
the life of the ICTY and its companion tribunal for Rwanda, the internationally
respected Prosecutor Richard Goldstone echoed Justice Robert Jackson's warnings
from the World War II era:
There is no question that history will judge the Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda on the fairness or unfairness of their proceedings.
Whether there are convictions or whether there are acquittals will not be
the yardstick. The measure is going to be the fairness of the proceedings.
Because the ICTY and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
drew their lifeblood from the political power of the UN Security Council, defense

20

id.

21 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(1), opened for signature Dec.

16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; Human Rights
Comm., Ato del Avellanal v. Peru, Comm. No. 202/1986, U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (1989) (Peruvian law
allowing only husbands to represent matrimonial property before the courts violated the Article 14(1)
of the ICCPR); Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 15: The Position ofA liens Under

the Covenant, TI 1, 6-7, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.1 at 18 (Apr. 11, 1986) ("once aliens are allowed
to enter the territory of a State party they are entitled to the rights set out in the [ICCPR] .... Aliens
shall be equal before the courts and tribunals . . . ").
22 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 12 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 6(2), adopted June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 612 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 6(1), openedfor signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; Organization of
American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970).
23 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art.
147,
adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (making the deprivation of fundamental
fairness during trial a grave breach of the Convention subject to universal jurisdiction).
24 Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 75(4).
25

Sara Siebert, The Pull of Criminal Law and the Push of Human Rights: Challenges in the

International Criminal Process, 11 IRISH STUDENT L. REv. 29, 36 (2003) (quoting Richard J.
Goldstone, Address before the Supreme Court of the United States, 1996 CEELI Leadership Award
Dinner (Oct. 2, 1996)).
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attorneys immediately argued that no defendant could receive a fair trial in
accordance with human rights norms. Given the political motivations for creating
the ICTY and the ICTR, and the perceptions within the affected regions,26 it was
plausible that judges could rule in good faith that equality of arms was structurally
impossible in an ad hoc tribunal as a per se matter. Such a presumption of an
automatic "inequality of arms" would have permitted all defendants facing
accountability to rely upon the still resident preconceptions of victor's justice and
political expediency as warranting full acquittal and release irrespective of the
actual conduct of trial.
In fact, years prior to the formation of the ICTY and the ICTR, the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights adopted a functional test for interpreting the
human rights obligation of all courts to "genuinely afford the accused the full
guarantees" before a judicial body "established by law."27 These issues swiftly
surfaced during the first trial litigated at the ICTY. In the Tadi6 case, the ICTY had
to determine whether the defendant's human rights are automatically violated by
prosecution before a court which was formed following the commission of the
alleged crimes.28 Noting that the ICCPR drafters rejected language specifying that
only "pre-established" forums would provide sufficient human rights protections,
the ICTY Appeals Chamber concluded that:
The important consideration in determining whether a tribunal has been
"established by law" is not whether it was pre-established or established
for a specific purpose or situation; what is important is that it be set up by a
competent organ in keeping with the relevant legal procedures, and that it
observes the requirements of procedural fairness.2 9
The Tadi6 standard subsequently became the cornerstone for assessing
26 In this context it is also worth remembering that the Security Council vote to establish the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda using the Chapter VII authority granted by the U.N.
Charter succeeded over the objections of the government of Rwanda, and it is clear that the intervening
fifteen plus years have not fully alleviated the tensions between an ad hoc tribunal operating in
Tanzania applying international jurisprudence and presumptions and the domestic government and
justice officials in Rwanda.
27 See Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 13: Equality Before the Courts and
the Right to a Fair and Public Hearing by an Independent Court Establishedby Law (Art. 14), 4,

U.N. Doc. A/43/40 (Apr. 13, 1984); Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 17: Right to
Privacy, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.l at 14 (Apr. 8, 1988). The Commission further commented on
whether military courts constitute a court under "law," stating that "the Covenant does not prohibit such
categories of courts" while affirming and stressing that such courts, as any and all others, must afford
the guarantees set forth in Article 14 of the ICCPR. General Comment No. 13, supra, 4. See also

Human Rights Comm., Cariboni v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 159/1983, U.N. Doc. A/39/40 (1987). The
Inter-American Commission has taken a similar approach. See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Annual
Report 1972, OEA/Ser. P, AG/doc. 305/73 rev. 1, (Mar. 14, 1973); Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Annual
Report 1973, 2-4, OEA/Ser. P, AG/doc. 409/174 (Mar. 5, 1974).
28 See MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUsTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL
WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 104-06 (1997).

29 Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defense Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
45 (Oct. 2, 1995); see also CHRISTOPHER SAFFERLING,

TOwARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 87-88 (2001) (noting the disparity between the

American Convention on Human Rights requirement that the criminal forum be established by
legislative act prior to the commission of the crime at bar and the corresponding rejection of a request
by Chile to include a similar provision in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
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every future defense claim to equality of arms and its influence has permeated the
jurisprudence of all the internationalized and ad hoc tribunals. Its residual power
cannot be overstated. The inherent legitimacy of the system of international
criminal trials depends upon the "requirements of procedural fairness.'o The very
authority of the judicial system thus depends upon procedural parity between the
defense and prosecution teams, which in turn requires the Trial Chambers to closely
monitor every motion and every aspect of representation and advocacy at all phases
of the trial proceedings.
Thus, despite the inherent advantages of the Prosecution in terms of
resources, time, and investigative assets, there is no presumption of an inequality of
arms. As a necessary corollary to that judicial finding, tribunal judges must
respond to a blizzard of trial motions related to the defense quest for equality of
arms. The Tadid finding in essence made the bench the arbiter of due process in the
sense that judges have taken it upon themselves to compensate, at least partially, for
the inherent inequality of resources by proactively protecting the due process rights
of the accused. In that manner, the function of the current system of international
justice has become much more closely aligned with an inquisitorial practice
whereby judges are more involved in the assessment of evidence, the evaluation of
charges, and the actual conduct of the trial proceedings." A substantial body of
practice has accordingly evolved across the entire field of international criminal
justice as rulings respond to a variety of commonly raised themes. At both the
ICTY and ICTR, for example, judges have repeatedly rejected plea agreements and
guilty pleas as unsupported by the facts or inconsistent with the interests of justice.32
More importantly, the role of judges as the guarantors of the due process
rights of defendants has had profound implications for the actual practice of
international justice, as the following sub-part will illustrate.
B. StructuralConcerns and the JudicialResponses

Defense attorneys in international criminal trials confront an array of
practical and legal difficulties in presenting effective representation for their clients.
Anecdotal evidence indicates that many potential witnesses and international
experts are reluctant to testify on behalf of the defense even when their testimony is
both probative of the actual truth of the events in dispute and necessary for a proper
legal interpretation of those events." This may arise in part from the residual
stigma attached in the popular mind to anyone associated with the horrendous acts
at bar. Similarly, there are many anecdotal examples, particularly in relation to
Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defense Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 145 (Oct. 2, 1995).
30

Michael Bohlander, A Silly Question? Court Sanctions Against Defence Counsel for Trial

Misconduct, 10 CiuM. L.F. 467, 468-71 (1999). See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Orid, Case No. IT-03-68AR73.2, Interlocutory Decision on Length of Defence Case, 19 (July 20, 2005) ("The question, then, is
whether, taking into account the complexity of the remaining issues, the amount of time and the
number of witnesses allocated to Orid's defense are reasonably proportional to the Prosecution's
allocation and sufficient to permit Orid a fair opportunity to present his case.") (hereinafter Orid
Decision on Length of Defence Case).
32 JENIA IONTCHEVA TURNER, PLEA BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS 234-35 (2009).
3 Defense Attorney Interview No. 4 (Apr. 18, 2010) (notes on file with author, defense attorneys
requested anonymity during interviews).
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proceedings in the ICTR and SCSL, in which witnesses at trial readily responded to
questions posed by the prosecution, but became uncommunicative and elusive on
cross examination.34 Witnesses in international tribunal practice are famously
unresponsive and difficult to control, which may be in part due to external pressures
and the clear undercurrent that witnesses do not wish to assist the acquittal of those
charged with destroying the social and economic fabric of society. The cultural and
communicative gaps between the witness and counsel can also contribute to this
differentiation. Experienced litigators seeking a smooth and rapid flow of questions
accompanied by the heat of cross examination and incisive critique of witness
testimony are almost certain to be disabused of that perception. Further
complicating the defense task, recent empirical evidence indicates that
approximately 50% of the witnesses in the ICTR gave trial testimony that
substantially varied from their pre-trial statements," while more than 90% of the
ICTR cases featured an alibi or other example of directly conflicting testimony
between prosecution and defense witnesses. These realities put a premium on
skilled defense perspectives that can illuminate testimonial gaps with factual
rebuttal to demonstrate bias, inaccuracy, or outright deception. This role is
particularly important when the defense team highlights the evidentiary gaps in
relation to the mode of personal liability by which the prosecutor alleges an
individualized nexus between a particular perpetrator and the wholesale pattern of
grievous crimes that are of sufficient gravity to merit accountability under
international norms. In a truth seeking process, these functions are vital.
In some circumstances, members of the defense team will face open
opposition or outright hostility from government officials as they attempt to
represent the interests of their clients. An American defense attorney named Peter
Erlinder was arrested by Rwandan authorities on charges that he committed a
domestic crime by denying the 1994 genocide and threatening national security
through his communications and writings. Rwandan officials insist that the work of
the defense can "instigate riots" and "civil disturbances."" The arrest had a ripple
effect as eleven defense lawyers with pending ICTR appearances requested delays
(one of which has already been denied at the time of this writing despite a finding
that the Rwandan domestic charges "are partly related to his submissions before the
Tribunal")." Members of the trial teams defending in the ICTR quite logically
expect to be able to travel in Rwanda, interview witnesses, and collect available
exculpatory evidence. Similar to the petitions made by Iraqi lawyers to the Iraqi

34 See ICTRIZigiranyirazo-Bagaragaza Witness Gives the Defence a Hard Time, HIRONDELLE

NEWS AGENCY, June 15, 2006 (when questioned by the defense the witness "said as little as possible").

3s Nancy Combs, Testimonial Deficiencies and Evidentiary
Uncertainties in International
Criminal Trials, UCLA J. INT'L & FOREIGN AFF. 235, 251 (2010).
36 Id. at 240.
3
Josh Kron, Lawyers Report Intimidation by Rwanda, N.Y. TIMEs, June 12, 2010, at Al.

38 Prosecutor v. Nizeyimana, Case No. ICTR 00-55C-PT, Decision on Ildephonse Nizeyimana's
Motion to Suspend Trial Proceedings Rule 73 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 7 (June 9,
2010). Erlinder's subsequent motion for a permanent stay of proceedings in the case against Aloys
Ntabakuze on the basis of the allegation that "the intimidation" by the Rwandan government made
counsel "unable to fully discharge their professional duties" was denied, and the Appeals Chamber
removed him from his role as lead counsel for Aloys Ntabakuze in the Bagasora Case based on his
refusal to appear before the Court. Aloys Ntabakuze v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 98-41A-A, Order
Imposing Sanctions on Ntabakuze's Lead Counsel (April 21, 2011), footnote 4.
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High Tribunal (IHT)," a majority of defense lawyers appearing before the ICTR
have signed a petition saying that they cannot continue to represent their clients
unless the Registrar can guarantee their safety. Almost simultaneously, the
Gotovina Trial Chamber granted a defense motion for an urgent petition to the
ICTY Appeals Chamber related to the arrest and pending criminal trial in Croatian
domestic courts of a key member of the defense.40
These incidents reveal lingering disparity between the obligation of states
to cooperate with the ad hoc tribunals "in the investigation and prosecution of
persons" and their actual treatment of defense attorneys and investigators.4
Governments have legal obligations to assist the court in the ad hoc tribunals, and
in the past prosecutors have been able to obtain assistance and political support
from governments far more readily than the defense. The difference in access to
international pressure/leverage arguably represents the most significant structural
limitation on equality of arms in the system of international justice. As a normative
matter, these examples illustrate that a broad statutory immunity granted to defense
counsel may be an important domestic dimension to augment the professional ethos
of the international defense bar. Every domestic accountability mechanism will be
implemented within the structure of a domestic statutory scheme that provides
jurisdictional authorities, appointment mechanisms for judges, funding channels,
legal procedures, evidentiary issues, and a myriad of other matters. One best
practice for the future may be to carve out criminal and civil immunity for any
activities of defense teams related to the performance of their duties as indeed they
are obligated to do under both the prevailing domestic code of ethics and the

modem Codes of Professional Conduct that will be discussed below.
Defense counsel who eschew viva voce testimony and rely instead on
documentary evidence face another and perhaps equally daunting challenge. In
many post-conflict settings, an entire region constitutes the crime scene.42 Military
forces entering the area are uniquely situated to preserve evidence, begin forensics
work at mass graves, and generate other highly probative evidence. The vast bulk
of what may become admissible evidence is therefore in the hands of national
authorities, who have established detailed mechanisms for providing that
information to the prosecution teams, but have often been far less forthcoming to
defense investigators. This structural imbalance in part began as the natural
reluctance of military officials to simply turn over volumes of intelligence to
attorneys who are often investigating allegations with not specific evidentiary goal
in mind. Atrocity crimes cases are inherently complex and evidence intensive. A
trained legal mind is an indispensable asset for discerning the legal value of
information amongst the mass of data categorized as intelligence information in the
wake of military success. Prosecutors at Nuremberg reviewed over 100,000
captured German documents, millions of feet of captured film, and over 25,000
3 See ENEMY OF THE STATE, supra note 8, at 114-15 (describing the circumstances under which
two defense attorneys were murdered in Baghdad as the Al-Dujail trial began and the refusal of other
defense attorneys to accept the security precautions offered by court officials).
40 Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. 06-90-T, Decision on Defense Request for Certification
to
Appeal the Trial Chamber Decision of 12 March 2010 (Apr. 21, 2010).
41 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 29, May 25, 1993,
32 I.L.M. 1203 [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
art. 28, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
42 Sebastian Junger, The Forensicsof War, VANITY FAIR,
Oct. 1999, at 138.
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photographs prior to conducting a trial that consumed 216 days and produced a
record of over 17,000 pages.43 German defense attorneys concluded that the failure
to institute procedures for defense examination of the documentary evidence in the
control of the government severely hindered their ability to provide an effective
This systematic disequilibrium prevented a full
defense for their clients."
examination of exculpatory evidence during the military commissions in the
aftermath of Nuremberg, and to a large extent this same imbalance persists to this
day. One German defense attorney noted that:
The defenders could utilize this entire confiscated material only so far as
the prosecuting authority decided, in the course of the processes, to submit
it to the court as evidence. The defenders themselves had no possibility
whatsoever to look through the archives in Washington and London for
exonerating evidence. Because of these facts, valuable material for the
defence has most certainly not been used.45
The fact that the ICTY has over six million documents in its database
shows that the collection of evidence can be a massive job. The critical need for
information management systems to be under the control of an interdisciplinary
team that remains focused on a particular evidentiary set from investigation to
appeal has proven to be one of the most potent lessons related to information
The interdisciplinary team should
accessibility and evidence management.
optimally have a sophisticated system in place to take these cases through appeal.
The lack of such an integrated system at the beginning of ICTY operations cost a
great deal of money and effort as the years went on and the investigations piled up.
In particular, the lack of adequate systems and personnel to comb through the vast
volume of available material hinders the search for exculpatory evidence which the
prosecution is obligated to disclose to the defense team under the rules of every
extant tribunal.
Defense teams will generally be underfunded and operate with less time
and with far fewer attorneys, investigators, and support staff, as compared to
prosecution teams.46 The prosecution will also enjoy much greater access to the
43 See REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIBUNALS 12, Publication 3080, Washington D.C., at

432-33

(1945)

[hereinafter

Robert

Jackson

Report],

available

at

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/jack63.asp#1.
4
Otto Kranzbuhler, Nuremberg: Eighteen Years Afterwards, 14 DEPAUL L. REV. 333 (1965),
reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 433, 436 (Gudnadl Mettraux, ed., 2008)
[hereinafter PERSPECTIVES ON THE NUREMBERG TRIAL].

45 Hans Latemser, Looking Back at the Nuremberg Trials with Special Consideration of the
Processes Against Military Leaders, 8 WHITTIER L. REV. 557, 561 (1987), reprinted in PERSPECTIVES

ON THE NUREMBERG TRIAL, supra note 44, at 476. In modem practice the typical defense team is
composed of a Lead Counsel, a Co-Counsel, two legal assistants, and one investigator per accused.

46 See e.g. Callixte Kalimanzira v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgment 136 (Oct. 20, 2010) (finding no violation of equality of arms despite the contrast between the
"large team" of 35 investigators who worked from 1999 to 2008 on behalf of the prosecution and the
two investigators available to the defense for a two and a half month period in 2008). David Wippman,

The Costs of InternationalProsecution, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 861, 872 (2006) (discussing the ICTY
budget). The 1993 budget for the ICTY, for example, was $276,000. That amount rose steadily to
more than $271 million before it reached a plateau. During 2004 and 2005, the combined tribunal
budgets exceeded $500 million, which represented one-sixth of the UN budget for that period.
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entire range of potentially relevant documentation and other evidence. This truism
in turn provides prosecutors a far freer hand in shaping the contours of the case.
During trials, for example, the prosecution team will be able to revise its
presentation of evidence as a tactical matter, while the defense must be prepared to
respond to each and every allegation. For example, during the Milogevid trial, of
the 380 charged events, only 40-50% actually provided the basis for admitted
evidence. Thus, the system of international justice may appear on the surface to be
impermissibly and inalterably tilted towards the prosecution. Some practitioners
have concluded that the balance of powers is fundamentally skewed.47 This is not to
imply, of course, that prosecution teams always have complete freedom to collect
evidence, as there have been instances of active governmental or organized local
resistance to ICTY and ICTR investigations within their respective regions;48 this
trend has continued in the ICC context as government officials in situation
49
countries have hindered investigative efforts on occasion.
Against the backdrop of an inherently uneven system, the Trial Chambers
have an inescapable duty to ensure the equality of arms that is the sine qua non of a
fundamentally fair judicial process. The modern reality is that the judges have
become the guarantors of procedural parity, examining several structural
imperatives in virtually every case. For example, the bench actively arbitrates
defense requests for additional time and resources. Indeed, in almost every trial,
defense requests for additional preparation time or resources are considered
carefully and are virtually always granted in some form. There is, however, a
strong judicial imperative to seek efficiency in the overall presentation of evidence,
which in turn has compelled judges to limit witness lists of both the prosecution and
defense and to manage the time available to each side to present its case. As a
result, a high percentage of motions practice involves the efforts by defense
attorneys or prosecution teams to gain greater latitude from the bench in the timing
of the case or the presentation of witnesses; if anything, the efforts of judges to
preserve the fairness to the extent feasible has the paradoxical effect of creating the
lengthy delays and recurring motions that can lead to perceptions of illegitimacy
and unfairness in the minds of the regional population.
The language of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Orid case perfectly
captures the legal imperative and accompanying practice that has become one of the
most actively litigated aspects of international trials:
The Appeals Chamber has long recognized that "the principle of equality
of arms between the prosecutor and accused in a criminal trial goes to the

47 See, e.g., Gabrielle McIntyre, Equality ofArms-Defining Human Rights in the Jurisprudence
of the International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 16 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 269 (2003).
48 See CARLA DEL PONTE & CHUCK SUDETIC, MADAME PROSECUTOR: CONFRONTATIONS
WITH
HUMANITY'S WORST CRIMINALS AND THE CULTURE OF IMPUNITY 53, 56-57 (2008) (describing the

active resistance of Yugoslav officials).
49 The local chief in Gulu, Uganda, for example, went on the radio to announce the license plate
of the vehicle carrying ICC investigators (CD-121) and ask citizens to drive them out of town due to
local hostility towards the court and its alleged bribery of witnesses. Sudanese officials have reportedly
detained persons suspected of cooperating with ICC prosecutors. Int'l Fed'n for Human Rights,
Serious Concerns About Harassment Faced by Persons Suspected of Supporting or Cooperating with
at
2,
2009),
available
in
Sudan
(Feb.
Criminal
Court
International
the

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49885789c.html.
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heart of the fair trial guarantee." At a minimum, "equality of arms
obligates a judicial body to ensure that neither party is put at a
disadvantage when presenting its case," certainly in terms of procedural
equity. This is not to say, however, that an Accused is necessarily entitled
to precisely the same amount of time or the same number of witnesses as
the Prosecution. The Prosecution has the burden of telling an entire story,
of putting together a coherent narrative and proving every necessary
element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Defense
strategy, by contrast, often focuses on poking specifically targeted holes in
the Prosecution's case, an endeavor which may require less time and fewer
witnesses. This is sufficient reason to explain why a principle of basic
proportionality, rather than a strict principle of mathematical equality,
generally governs the relationship between the time and witnesses
allocated to the two sides.
In addition, it should be noted that although Rule 73ter gives the Trial
Chamber the authority to limit the length of time and number of witnesses
allocated to the defense case, such restrictions are always subject to the
general requirement that the rights of the accused pursuant to Article 21 of
the Statute of the International Tribunal be respected. Thus, in addition to
the question whether, relative to the time allocated to the Prosecution, the
time given to the Accused is reasonably proportional, a Trial Chamber
must also consider whether the amount of time is objectively adequate to
permit the Accused to set forth his case in a manner consistent with his
rights."'
The conduct of extensive pre-trial hearings to set out judicial expectations,
impose guidelines, and generate the deadlines and criteria that in the aggregate
result in an efficient trial has become an accepted best practice in the international
criminal system.'
For example, taking his cue from the widespread perception of disorder
and unruliness during the Al-Dujail trial involving Saddam Hussein and his codefendants, the presiding IHT judge in the much more complex Anfal genocide
case held an extensive pre-trial conference with all of the prosecutors and defense
counsel that ensured a smooth and orderly process even though Saddam Hussein
was also one of the co-accused in the Anfal case. In other Tribunals, Trial
Chambers have also monitored the composition of the defense team, and have gone
so far on occasion as overturning the decisions of the Registry, which is responsible
for administering the various Directives on Assignment of Defense Counsel.
52
In accordance with their role as the guardians of procedural parity,
so Orid Decision on Length of Defence Case, supra note 31,
7-8. See also Prosecutor v. Prlid,
Case No. IT-04-74-AR73.7, Decision on Defendants Appeal Against "D6cision Portant Attribution du
Temps Ala Ddfense pour la Pr6sentation des Moyens AD6charge,"
16, 19, 39 (July 1, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/080701 .pdf.
2187
' See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 64(8)(b), July 17, 1998,
U.N.T.S. 90. [hereinafter Rome Statute]; ICC R. P. & EVID. R. 140 [hereinafter ICC RPE].
52 This expanded role has also generated some criticism from practitioners who argue that the
Rules injecting an inquisitorial flavor into current tribunals "invite the judiciary to take over the job of
prosecuting."

GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL
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international judges have also actively monitored the right of the defendant to
adequate facilities for the preparation of the defense based on a totality of the
Some Appeals Chambers have granted additional
circumstances test.53
representation to defendants in circumstances that in the Court's view would
otherwise erode equality of arms and the correlative right to a fair and expeditious
trial, and have implemented an extensive system for ensuring that all defendants
are represented by counsel, as will be examined in more detail below. The
experience of the ICTY indicates that this will be a major expense associated with
the ICC, as the provision of gratis counsel consumed some ten percent of the ICTY
budget, to the tune of some ten to thirteen million dollars per year.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly from the perspective of due process
rights, as well as the interests of the states that support and fund the international
tribunals, virtually every Trial Chamber in every jurisdiction surveyed has
aggressively managed the flow of information to the defense teams. The judicial
recognition of the necessity for managing the flow of information to the defense is a
relatively recent phenomenon in practice. Defense motions for access to
information have become the most pervasive aspect of motions practice. Such
evidentiary motions are especially critical when the defense seeks access to
exculpatory information," or where the Court is confronted with the need to order
In practice, the ICTY has
disclosure of such exculpatory information.
operationalized a two-tier screening process during the investigative phases of its
work, segregating document collection into low security and high security evidence.
This process facilitates disclosure of evidence to the defense as it is far easier to
give the defense team blanket access to evidence that does not implicate the
security interests of states. This is especially true early in an investigation when the
ultimate relevance of a particular piece of evidence may be unknown because
specific charges against specific defendants have not yet been framed. An ancillary
benefit of such segregation is that the smaller database of high value evidence is
much more likely to contain any exculpatory evidence which in turn aids the
process of identifying and disclosing such evidence pursuant to the specific
disclosure obligations. Defense attorneys can search the majority of collections
JUSTICE 377 (2d ed. 2002).
s3 See e.g., Prosecutor v. Prlid, Case No. IT-4-74-AR73.9, Decision on Slobodan Praljak's
Appeal Against the Trial Chamber's Decision of 16 May 2008 on Translation of Documents, 1 26
(Sept. 4, 2008), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/080904.pdf.
5 Prosecutor v. Popovid, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Decision on Third Request for Review of the
Registry Decision on the Assignment of Co-Counsel for Radivoje Milited (Feb. 20, 2007),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/tdec/en/070220.pdf.
ss U.S. Institute of Peace, Special Report 122, Building the Iraqi Special Tribunal: Lessons from
at
http://
(2004),
available
Justice
7
International
Criminal
Experiences
in

www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/srl22.html [hereinafter Special Report 122].
56 Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 67(2); ICC RPE, supra note 51, R. 83. See e.g, Prosecutor v.
Augustin Ngirabatware, Case No. ICTR-99-54-T, Decision on Defence Motion For Disclosure of
Additional Exculpatory and Other Relevant Material Pursuant to Defence Oral Motion Presented on 24
November 2010, 26 (Apr. 1, 2011) (noting that the Prosecution obligation to disclose exculpatory
evidence is to be construed broadly to require disclosure of any evidence that is potentially exculpatory
rather than requiring a showing that the evidence is actually exculpatory).
s7 For example, the Rome Statute expressly obligates the ICC to supervise the prosecutor's
performance of the duty to provide the defense with any information indicating the innocence of the
accused (which includes evidence mitigating guilt), as well as anything in its possession "which may
affect the credibility of prosecution evidence." Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 67(2).
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themselves and look for items that might be useful to them or support their theory
of the case. This practice has spread to other tribunals as a way of increasing
efficiency by minimizing the grounds for defense delays during trial. However, the
information system in use at the ICTR is cumbersome and only available to the
defense from within the Tribunal building.
Management of the flow of information by the bench will, of course,
always function against the bedrock boundary of the relevant Rules of Procedure
for each Tribunal that permit states and organizations to maintain the confidentiality
and limitations on subsequent use of sensitive information, even in the context of
litigation." Defense motions related to information that is the proprietary property
of a state or other organization are today perhaps the most hotly contested issues in
the motions practice of the tribunals. On this issue, as in other areas, the pursuit of
equality of arms requires judges to balance the rights of the defendant against everpresent economic and political realities facing the tribunals. As ICTY Judge David
Hunt noted (in dissent) in the context of the Milogevid trial:
This Tribunal will not be judged by the number of convictions which it
enters, or by the speed with which it concludes the Completion Strategy
[referring to the Security Council mandated closure of the ad hoc tribunals]
which the Security Council has endorsed, but by the fairness of its trials.
The Majority Appeals Chamber Decision and others in which the
Completion Strategy has been given priority over the rights of the accused
will leave a spreadingstain on this Tribunal's reputation."
In a similar vein, though it had earlier issued a contempt ruling against the
defendant and sentenced him to fifteen months in prison for his disruptive and
obstructionist tactics, Trial Chamber III of the ICTY declined to impose counsel on
Vojislav egelj against his wishes despite recognizing the arguments that denying
him the right to self-representation would make the proceedings "more efficient"
and "less disruptive" in light of the ICTY Completion Strategy.6 o
Thus, the role of the judiciary as the guardian of equity in the proceedings
has been well established, even when it raises conceptual conflicts with other goals
of the accountability process. However, it is clear that the need to ensure equality
of arms in no way gives the defense team an unwarranted power over the court.
Holding that the Trial Chamber did not abuse its discretion in setting limits on the
defense team in the Krajiinik case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber observed that the
defense had "considerable discretion" when planning its "preparation and on
presentation of evidence, as long as the Defence case closed on a certain date
(which date was pushed back several times to accommodate the Defence)." 6 ' It was
5

See infra Part V(A).

9 Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milogevid, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.4, Dissenting Opinion of Judge
David Hunt on Admissibility of Evidence in Chief in the Form of Written Statement (Majority Decision
given
30
September
2003),
S
22
(Oct.
21,
2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan-milosevic/acdec/en/03102 1diss.htm.
Prosecutor v. egelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, D37-1/45214B1S, Public Version of the
"Consolidated Decision on Assignment of Counsel, Adjournment, and Prosecution Motion for
Additional Time With Separate Opinion of Presiding Judge Antonetti in Annex," 80 (Nov. 24, 2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/tdec/en/091124.pdf.
61 Prosecutor v. Krajignik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Appeals Chamber Judgement, 1 108 (Mar. 17,
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up to the Defense to "organize [sic] its case within the time limits imposed."62
Thus, although judges may monitor the case and facilitate equality of arms, the
ethical and professional imperative of the defense team is to properly manage
available resources on behalf of the criminal defendant.
III.

ETHICAL AND PROCEDURAL CHALLENGES FACING THE DEFENSE

An assessment of the evolution of the international defense bar requires
consideration of past defense practices and the perceived poor performances of
counsel. The diligence and professionalism that is commonplace in the daily grind
of trial preparation far from the headlines and accolades of professional peers goes
unreported and is unremarkable. The griindnorm in practice is that a very, very
high percentage of defense counsel are dedicated professionals who serve the ends
of justice and their clients to the best of their ability, often at great professional
hardship 3 and occasional personal risk. There have been, nevertheless, some
notable professional lapses that in turn spawned significant organizational and
jurisprudential responses.
For example, the first ICTY case, Prosecutor v. Tadi6, also included the
first contempt proceedings against a defense counsel at the ICTY. Milan Vujin
performed pro bono work for the defense team. Following the Tadid conviction, he
became counsel for the appellate phase of the proceedings.6 Between September
1997 and April 1998, Milan Vujin instructed witnesses preparing to make
statements to his co-counsel to lie, nodded his head to indicate to witnesses during
their interviews when to say yes and when to say no, intimidated witnesses in a
manner that dissuaded them from telling the truth, knowingly instructed a witness
to make false statements to the Tribunal, and actually paid a witness who provided
a statement. This pattern of conduct resulted in the first clear expression of the
Tribunal's inherent judicial authority to punish defense counsel it finds guilty of
contempt. The Appeals Chamber found Vujin in contempt, because he "put
forward a case ... that he knew to be false in material respects," and he
"manipulated Witnesses A and B by seeking to avoid any identification by them in
statements of their evidence of persons who may have been responsible for the
crimes for which Tadid had been convicted."" The Appeals Chamber held the
contempt to be serious because Vujin's conduct was "against the interests of his
client," and therefore "str[uck] at the very heart of the criminal justice system.""
The Chamber justified its holding with the observation that "tribunals necessarily
rely very substantially upon the honesty and propriety of counsel in the conduct of
litigation. Counsel are permitted important privileges by the law which are justified
2009), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krajisnik/acjug/en/090317.pdf.
62

Id.

Defense attorneys in the context of the Iraqi High Tribunal refused the offers of the Tribunal
and the Regime Crimes Liaison Office for personal protection and the relocation of their families
because they argued that they would in essence sacrifice the remainder of the legal practice by ignoring
other cases and clients to focus solely on the work of the internationalized tribunal.
See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77, Judgment on Allegations of Contempt
6
against Prior Counsel, T 2 (Jan. 31, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjugen/vujaj000131e.pdf.
6
Id.T 160.
Id. 1167.
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only upon the basis that they can be trusted not to abuse them."67 The Judgment
accordingly ordered Vujin to pay a fine to the Registry of the Tribunal and directed
the Registrar "to consider striking" his name "off the list of assigned counsel" and
report "his conduct ... to the professional body to which he belongs." Vujin in turn
appealed this judgment, and, in 2001, the Appeals Chamber dismissed his appeal
and affirmed the prior rulings. The Registrar ordered Vujin's name to be
withdrawn from the list of assigned counsel, and the Appeals Chamber in turn
upheld his removal from the list of authorized counsel on September 11, 2001.
Milan Vujin's misconduct established the principle that the recognized
right of a defendant to choose counsel can be limited in the interests of justice
where the counsel's own conduct comes into question. Furthermore, the Registrar's
power to remove assigned counsel also extends to private counsel. In an important
decision extending this line of reasoning, the Court ruled in Prosecutorv. Kovae as
follows:
The Tribunal does, however, possess an inherent jurisdiction, deriving
from its judicial function, to ensure that its exercise of the jurisdiction
which is expressly given to it by the [Tribunal] Statute is not frustrated and
that its basic judicial functions are safeguarded. As an international
criminal court, the Tribunal must therefore possess the inherent power to
deal with conduct, which interferes with its administration of justice ...
such an inherent power includes the power to refuse audience to counsel.

Some cynics would assume that the conduct of Milan Vujin typifies the
unprofessional intimidation and evidence manipulation of ICTY defense counsel.
In fact, the Vujin contempt conviction remains the only one of its kind in all of the
Tribunal's jurisprudence. There have been only two other contempt cases brought
against defense counsel in the ICTY (arising from the same circumstances in the
same case), and both resulted in full acquittals because the evidence of defense
misconduct was flimsy and unsubstantiated. 9
The famous fee splitting scandals also mark an inescapable watershed in
the ethical and procedural evolution of the tribunals. In the early years of the ICTY
Id. 168.
6
Prosecutor v Kova6, Case No. IT-96-23-T, Decision on the Request of the Accused Radomir
Kova6 to allow Mr. Milan Vujin to Appear as Co-Counsel Acting Pro Bono, 1 9 (Mar. 14, 2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tdec/en/00314DS21257 .htm. See also Prosecutor v. Tadid, supra
note 64, at 28 (noting that the inherent power of the Tribunal to deal with contempt has necessarily
existed ever since its creation, and the existence of that power does not depend upon a reference being
made to it in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence); Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No. IT-02-54-R77.4,
Decision on Contempt of the Tribunal against Kosta Bulatovid (May 13, 2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan-milosevic/tjug/en/bulatovic.pdf.
69 Prosecutor v. Avramovi6 & Simi6, Case No. IT-95-9-R77, Judgement (Mar. 29, 2000) (issuing
not guilty findings on allegations of bribery, suboming, perjury, and witness intimidation as the Trial
Chamber noted that the witness against counsel embellished noticeably as the potential for personal
gain became more apparent); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT 95-14/1-AR77, Judgement on
Appeal
by
Anto
Nobilo
against
Finding
of
Contempt
(May
20,
2001),
(acquitting defendant of the
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/aleksovskilacjug/en/nob-ajO10530e.pdf
allegation of intentionally disclosing the identity of a protected witness because the evidence indicated
that he did not knowingly do so). .
67
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and ICTR, defense counsel would often agree to share a portion of the funds paid
by the Registrar with the defendant or the defendant's family members, a practice
that became known as "fee splitting.",o This practice was effectuated either through
a regular apportionment of a percentage of the counsel's fee to the defendant or
through the provision of gifts and other indirect support and maintenance to the
defendant and his relatives." Given the disparate financial resources allotted to the
defense and prosecution teams and the widespread criticism over the spiraling costs
of the ad hoc tribunals, the fee splitting scandal had a visceral power that would in
time create a frozen perception of defense dysfunction in the minds of many
observers and pundits. Fee splitting became emblematic of a profligate and out of
control international bureaucracy seemingly manipulated by a corrupt bar in pursuit
of personal enrichment while engaged in the fagade of justice. At the time, counsel
had no incentive for procedural efficiency?2 during trials because they were simply
paid on an hourly basis according to a set fee schedule. Neither the ICTY nor ICTR
had an established mechanism to control the spiraling costs, which in turn created a
gravy train mentality among some counsel who became accustomed to the much
higher pay available doing the international criminal work than that available in
their domestic system.
In perhaps the most egregious documented example, fees to the appointed
counsel of one indigent ICTY defendant exceeded $1.4 million over a four-year
period, of which some $175,000 went to the defendant's family to purchase various
properties and costly merchandise. 73 One oft-ignored reality in this context is that
the problem of employing family members of the accused as members of the
defense team, which really represented a subterfuge for diverting tribunal resources
to aid the defendant, was initially facilitated by the ICTY Registry through a
"liberal attitude" and a "very tolerant approach" regarding the choice of counsel.74
Indeed, in the early years of the ad hoc tribunals, fee splitting arrangements were
arguably permissible under the ICTY and ICTR Statutes and Rules.
These scandals predictably prompted wide-ranging reforms that developed
the system of uniform checks and balances within which the defense bar operates
today on a basis of predictability and ethical equivalence. The Registrar almost
immediately amended the Directive on the Assignment of Counsel to prohibit the
employment of family members on the defense team," and implemented a system
70 U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General's Comprehensive Report on the Progress
Made by
the International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia in Reforming Its LegalAid System, T 42,

U.N. Doc. A/58/288 (Aug. 12, 2003) [hereinafter Comprehensive ICTY Report].
71 See Office of Internal Oversight Services, Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services
on the Investigation Into Possible Fee-Splitting Arrangements Between Defense Counsel and Indigent
Detainees at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Tribunal for the

Former Yugoslavia,
72 Id T111.

1 13,

U.N. Doc. A/55/759 (Feb. 1, 2001).

7
Mark Ellis, Defense Counsel Appearing Before International Tribunals: Past Experiences and
Future Challenges, 4 J. HUM. RIGHTS. 491, 496 n.59 (2005) (citing Judith Armatta, Crackdown on War
Profiteering at Tribunals: Court Acts to Eliminate Extortion of Fees from Appointed Counsel, July 19,

2002 (www.cij.org)).
74 RODNEY DIXON

& KARIM KHAN, ARCHBOLD INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURTS-

PRACTICE, PROCEDURE, & EVIDENCE TIT20-104-105 (2d ed. 2005).
75 Comprehensive ICTY Report, supra note 70. Article 16 of the Directive on the Assignment of
Defense Counsel reads: "Members of the family or close friends of suspects, accused and counsel are
not eligible for an assignment under this directive as counsel, expert, legal assistant, investigator,
translator or interpreter unless the Registrar determines that the assignment is in the interest of justice."

2011

The Development of the InternationalDefense Bar

399

of three judges to work with the Registrar on other assignment related issues,
including the selection of poorly qualified or trained lawyers by a defendant as well
as lawyers whose ethical standards "raise questions."" In a parallel improvement,
the Registrar amended the Code of Professional Conduct for Defence Counsel to
ban fee splitting as of August 2002," and implicitly linked fee splitting to the
underlying obligation "[n]ever to be influenced by improper or patently dishonest
behaviour on the part of a client""7 by imposing an explicit duty to report any effort
by a defendant to establish an illicit scheme for skimming tribunal funding away
from its intended purposes."
Apart from the ethical reforms, the fee splitting scandals prompted two
other developments that have had lasting import for the maturation of the defense
bar. First, the ICTY instituted a lump sum payment system for the defense that was
intended to accomplish the following objectives:
(a) To provide defence teams with greater flexibility and incentive to
manage their resources and time in the most efficient manner;
(b) To distinguish between the level of difficulty of various cases by
providing more resources to extremely complex cases;
(c) To streamline procedure by allowing defence to submit more
standardized invoices, which are reviewed before payment can be
authorized;
(d) To facilitate responsible budgeting of the Tribunal's legal aid resources,
by establishing a system that is less open to abuse and that allows for more
reliable projections of cost.o
The lump sum system was based on a complex formula derived from a
multi-factor evaluative framework based on the complexity of the case (relevant to
the projected costs of investigation and litigation) and its projected length. Its
intent was to quantify otherwise subjective assessments and to incentivize defense
counsel to complete the stages of criminal cases as efficiently as possible. Funds
were paid out at specified intervals and percentages of the total estimated costs of
the defense. The SCSL operates under a similar system, while the ICTR adopted a

Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Directive on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, art.

16(F), U.N. Doc. IT/73/Rev.I1 (July 11, 2006).
76 Comprehensive ICTY Report, supra note
70, 54.
7
Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda, Code of Professional Conduct for Defense Counsel, art. 5bis,
at
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/O/English/Legal/Defence%2OCounsel/English/04available
Code%20ofo20Conduct%20for/2ODefence%20Counsel.pdf (last visited July 15, 2010) [hereinafter
ICTR Code of Conduct]; Comprehensive ICTY Report, supra note 70, 1 42. But see Ellis, supra note
73, at 496 (noting that anecdotal evidence indicates that some measure of fee splitting may still occur).
78 ICTR Code of Conduct, supra
note 77, art. 5(c).
Id. art. 5bis(2). See also Int. Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Code of Professional
Conduct for Counsel Appearing Before the International Tribunal, art.18, U.N. Doc. IT/125/Rev.1,
(July 12, 2002) [hereinafter ICTY Code of Conduct].
so Comprehensive ICTY Report, supra note 70, 24; DIXON & KHAN, supra note 74, T 20-151 69 (nicely summarizing the development and details of the current funding mechanisms).
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monthly maximum on the number of defense hours that could be compensated by
the Court. Instituting its own lump sum formulas for what became accepted as a
best practice, the ICC Assembly of States Parties estimated that the average length
of a case (from pre-trial to the appeals phase) will be fifty-one months, and that the
cost of mounting a defense during that period is £1,259,496 ($1,979,835 using the
contemporaneous exchange rate). 8 ' The allocations for defense counsel are
intended to defray the total costs of investigation, salaries, travel, and incidental
expenses during each period of pre-trial, trial, and appeal. Not surprisingly, these
calculations have resulted in extensive litigation.
Secondly, in a closely related development of perhaps more lasting import,
the ICTY implemented a strict set of guidelines to determine the indigency of a
particular defendant as a precursor to receiving legal aid from the Court. Through
2000, a defendant was either entitled to full financial assistance or none at all. As
Mark Ellis points out, nearly every defendant who appeared before the ICTY and
the ICTR in their early years. was declared indigent and subsequently assigned
counsel, which of course entailed a substantial financial commitment by the
tribunals. 82 Of perhaps more overarching significance, the right of an indigent
defendant to assigned counsel, without costs, is a fundamental tenet of international
law." The strengthened system post-2002 recognized either partial indigency based
upon established formulas, or in some cases a conditional indigency whereby a
defendant would receive aid conditioned upon the recovery of future known or
suspected personal assets. The ICTY buttressed the legal aid system by appointing
a financial investigator in March 2002 to assess whether the defendant could fund
an adequate defense that would meet equality of arms standards.8" In practice, the

Assembly of States Parties, Report on the Principles and Criteria for the Determination of
Indigence for the Purposes of Legal Aid Annex, ICC-ASP/6/[NF.1 (May 31, 2007), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-6-INF.1_English.pdf By way of comparison, according to
the U.N.'s assessment of the costs at the ICTY issued in 1999, a defense team in the ICTY at the pretrial stage then cost the tribunal (on average) $22,000 (E13,994) to $25,000 (E15,903) per month, which
increased to about $45,000 (E28,625) during the trial. See Mark S. Ellis, The Evolution of Defence
81

Counsel Appearing Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 37 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 949, 953 (2003).

82 Ellis, supra note 73, at 491 (observing that the costs of indigent defense consumed
some ten
percent of the entire ICTY budget, for example).
8 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that: "Everyone charged with a penal
offence has the right to all ... the guarantees necessary for his defense." Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, UN Doc. A/RES/217(III), art. 11(1) (Dec. 10, 1948). The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ensures that every person charged with a criminal
offence has the right to "have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice
so require, and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for
it." ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 14(3)(d). The U.N. Principles on the Role of Lawyers state that
governments "shall ensure the provision of sufficient funding and other resources for legal services to
the poor." Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of

Offenders, Havana, Cuba, Aug. 27-Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principleson the Role ofLawyers, art. 3, U.N.

Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990). Other international conventions that guarantee the right to legal
assistance include the American Convention on Human Rights, which provides the accused the right
"to be assisted by legal counsel of his own choosing" and to "be assisted by counsel provided by the
state . . . ." Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, art. 8(2)(d-e),
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. The African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights provides the accused "the right to defense, including the right to be defended by counsel of his
choice." African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 7(l)(c), June 27, 1981, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58, 60.
8 Comprehensive ICTY Report, supra note 70, T 40.
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Registrar became involved in the determination of eligibility for legal aid,' which
prompted attorneys to represent defendants pro bono in the hopes of becoming
selected as counsel. The Registrar selects the counsel from the list of qualified
counsel and is the sole decision-maker regarding the assignment of counsel, which
in turn prompts extended litigation from defendants who argue that their due
process rights have been trampled in the process. The process of creating and
sustaining a list of qualified counsel has also led to some manipulation of the
requirements for inclusion. For instance, the ICTY initially only required the
defense lawyer to be fluent in one of the working languages of the court (English or
French) and to be admitted to the bar in his country. This language requirement has
been ignored on occasion, prompting criticism. The ICTR sets forth another
requirement-before being admitted, the lawyer must have seven years of practice,
86 while the ICTY Registrar reserves the power to unilaterally strike counsel off the
list in particular cases based on the subjective assessment that they possess
"insufficient experience" to properly handle the demands of the case. 7 Though less
than thirty percent of the lawyers before the ICTY are chosen from the Registry,

some defendants vehemently protest the restrictions imposed by the Registrar's list.
In the Karadiid case, the Registrar eliminated all but five of the more than 150
potential counsel on the list before submitting five possibilities to the accused for
his selection, in some instances by imposing standards beyond those contained in
Article 44 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Of those five, none came from
the Balkans, four had previously defended clients who had fought against Serbs,
and one was a former ICTY prosecutor. Thus, it should come as no surprise that
Karad2id resisted assignment of those counsel.
The overall ethical climate of the defense bar operates against the context
of a complex procedural posture. The sui generis blend of procedures and practices
among the extant tribunals in itself generates a recurring series of ethical dilemmas
International tribunal practice involves a complex
for defense counsel.
intermingling of rules, practices, and presumptions that make the task of effective
defense significantly more difficult due to procedural imprecision and
unpredictability. Following his eighteen months of labor alongside lawyers from
other legal systems, Justice Jackson observed that "trial methods and techniques are
very dissimilar, but as we proved at Nuremberg, the differences are not
insuperable."89 German lawyers at the International Military Tribunal grappled with
the details of cross-examination grounded in the practice of common law systems."
In the more recent past, the legal standards for guilty pleas have provided fertile
85 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milutinovid, Case No. IT-99-37-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal on Motion for Additional Funds, T1 36-41 (Nov. 13, 2003) (Hunt, J., dissenting) (decrying the
erection of "impossible barriers" by the Registrar and the supervision of the system by legal officers
whose "obvious purpose is to make the administration of the legal aid system easier for the junior legal
officers with no apparent experience in trials").
86 ICTR R. P. & EVID. R. 45(A) [hereinafter ICTR
RPE].
87 Bjbm Elberling, Some Observations on Defence Aspects of the Karadei Case-And a Plea for
"Hybrid"
Representation in International Criminal Law, The Hague Justice Portal, (Mar. 1, 2010),

http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/ll/496.html.
88 Id (discussing the circumstances surrounding the choice of counsel by the Registry).
89

Robert H. Jackson, Lawyers Today: The Legal Profession in a World of Paradox, 33 A.B.A. J.

24, 89 (Jan. 1947).

See WHITNEY R. HARRIS, MURDER BY THE MILLIONS: RUDOLF HOESS AT AUScHWITZ

(2005).
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grounds for appeals, as the common practice in adversarial legal systems has been
introduced into the inquisitorial international systems to increase efficiency and
minimize costs.9' The International Military Tribunal set the lasting precedent for
simplifying evidentiary requirements in favor of a full airing of available facts
before a panel of judges. Justice Jackson noted that "peculiar and technical rules of
evidence developed under the common-law system of jury trials to prevent the jury
from being influenced by improper evidence constitute a complex and artificial
science," and accordingly accepted that rules of evidence at Nuremberg should put
the premium on the probative value of the evidence.92 Although dispensing with
rigid rules of evidence gave the International Military Tribunal "a large and
somewhat unpredictable discretion," it also permitted both the prosecution and
defense to select evidence on the basis of "what it was worth as proof rather than
whether it complied with some technical requirement."9 ' The Delali6 Trial
Chamber recognized this reality by noting that current rules of evidence and
practice "may have a common law or civilian origin but the final product may be an
amalgam of both ... so as to render it sui generis."94
Since 1945, rather than operating under restrictive rules of evidence, all of
the tribunals applying international humanitarian law have permitted evidence so
long as it is "relevant and necessary for the determination of the truth.""
Unconsciously echoing the standard of the Rome Statute that permits evidence
"necessary for the determination of the truth," one Iraqi investigative judge
working in the IHT insisted that, "in our system, only the evidence speaks.""
Rather than developing a straitjacket set of rules related to the introduction of
evidence, the international and internationalized tribunals today have a broader
mandate to "apply rules of evidence which will best favour a fair determination of
the matter before it and are consonant with the spirit of the Statute and general
principles of law."98
91 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgement, $ 7 (Mar. 5,
(discussing the ethical
1998), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/tjug/en/erd-tsj980305e.pdf
implications of a defense counsel who apparently did not fully understand the implications of or
procedures for implementing a guilty plea on behalf of his client which cast doubt on the effectiveness
of representation).
92 ROBERT H. JACKSON, REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO
THE

INTERNATIONAL

CONFERENCE

ON

MILITARY

TRIALS,

(1947),

available

at

http://avalon.law.yale.edulimt/jack preface.asp. Interestingly, as a matter of historical record, the teams
of international prosecutors at Nuremberg did not develop detailed elements of crimes that have
become an accepted feature of every subsequent international process.
93 Id This statement is true, though not without the notable caveat that Justice Jackson simply
assumed that the defense teams had adequate access to all available information suitable to select the
evidence needed and to form the defense theories of the cases.
94 Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Motion on Presentation of
1997),
(May
1,
15
Esad
Landzo,
by
the
Accused,
Evidence
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tdec/en/70501DE2.htm.
9 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Rome, It., June 15-July 17, 1998, Report of the Committee of the Whole,
art. 69(3), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/8 (July 17,1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/diplomaticconferences/icc- 1998/vol/english/vol Illle.pdf.
96 Rome Statute, supra note 51, art.
69(3).
97 Interview with Judge Ra'id Juhi, Chief Investigative Judge, Iraqi High Criminal Court (Aug. 2,
2006).
98 Iraqi Special Tribunal R. P. & Evid. 59. This provision is adjacent to the common sense caveat
that in accordance with the well established best practices of other tribunals, the Trial Chamber should
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This evidentiary freedom in theory puts the premium on the educative and
ameliorative function of the trial process. Evidentiary freedom, in turn raises the
image of the attentive international judge who is ever present and ever vigilant to
serve as the independent guardian of the due process rights of the defendant. In
practice, the mixed nature of tribunal processes has occasionally posed challenging
representational quandaries. Counsel cannot rely solely on the judiciary to protect
the rights of the accused and must therefore assume a more zealous and vigilant
posture than might ordinarily be the case in an inquisitorial domestic system.
Defense work in the context of the tribunals necessarily involves immersion in an
insular system in which appeals and evidentiary motions are resolved by the judges'
colleagues, and in which the conduct of counsel could quite conceivably impair the
defense efforts in other cases. During the eelebidi case at the ICTY, for instance,
the presiding judge repeatedly slept through proceedings in open court, which in
turn prompted defense counsel to raise the issue to the senior legal officer of the
Trial Chamber, the Registrar (who allegedly convinced counsel to withdraw a
motion for mistrial and a request for withdrawal of representation), and the
President of the Court, Judge Cassese at the time. Counsel approached this
"sensitive issue in the most delicate way possible"99 because she felt that the judge
lacked "judicial temperament, self-restraint and common decency."o Rather than
vigorously filing motions, which would have been the ethical expectation in an
adversarial system, counsel tip-toed around the concern that one of the fact-finders
was inattentive based on the belief that raising a direct complaint to the Trial
Chamber during trial "would have been inappropriate and futile" and "would
necessarily have alienated one of the three triers of fact, causing potentially
irreparable harm" to the defense case.1o' The defense later appealed the conviction
on grounds, inter alia, that the presiding judge "denied appellants the right to the
full and competent judicial decision of questions of law, fact, and evidence and
improperly denied appellants a fair trial, and the appearance of a fair trial."'02 The
eelebidi defense was caught between the ethical duty to serve the best interests of
the defendant and the pragmatic need to solve the problem in good faith as an
officer of the court.
Counsel relied on the assurance of Judge Cassese that he "would attend to
the matter," but the Appeals Chamber later disallowed her efforts to gather
testimony from the court officials with whom she spoke. The Appeals Chamber
ultimately denied this ground for appeal in the absence of any showing of "actual
prejudice""o on the basis that "[n]o attempt was made to raise the issue formally
before the Trial Chamber."'" The signal sent to defense counsel by this strand of
"exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair
prejudice, considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." Id.
Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Chamber Judgement, $ 642 (Feb. 20,
2001) [hereinafter Celebidi Appeals Judgement].
Id. 1648.
'o' Id. 1644.
'02 Id. T 620.
'03 Id. 650.
'Id
642. See also Prosecutor v. Augustin Ngirabatware, Case No. ICTR-99-54-ARI5B,
Decision on Augustin Ngiirabatware's Appeal of the Bureau's Decision of 25 January 2011 on
Disqualification (Apr. 18, 2011).
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the Oelebiei appeal and its replication in ICTR jurisprudence does not on its surface
bolster confidence in the independence and diligence of judges in protecting the due
process rights of the defendant, which in turn may explain the veritable explosion in
defense evidentiary motions and procedural challenges in the past six or seven
years. The decline in defense recusal motions mirrors the rise in evidentiary and
procedural challenges during trial. In the ICTR, there has been a corresponding
relative decline in defense motions to disqualify judges .*os While this decline
"may attest to a distinct lack of enthusiasm defence counsel may feel at the prospect
of challenging a judge's impartiality"'06 it also signals the emergence of a defense
bar prepared to raise and litigate a much wider range of procedural and evidentiary
motions. In this manner, the aggressive and proactive litigation of defense motions
more closely approximates an adversarial model of challenging evidence and
continually advocating defense perspectives on the record to establish grounds for
subsequent appeal if needed.
Nevertheless, the varying procedures, and, it must be noted, interjurisdictional inconsistencies, for the introduction of evidence continue to raise
serious ethical issues for diligent defense counsel. For example, widely respected
former ICTY (and U.S. federal appeals court judge) Patricia Wald, noted that in the
early years of the Tribunal:
[T]he bulk of defense counsel are Balkan-trained lawyers and are typically
not experienced at cross-examination. Some are quick learners, but others
are painfully awkward and unfocused on just what they are trying to
accomplish. They sometimes argue with or even criticize the witnesses.
They also go off on tangents that are not always relevant to their case. The
Tribunal is now operating training courses for appointed lawyers, but,
candidly, it is not easy to acculturate lawyers in a wholly new legal system
in a few days of lectures or even simulated exercises. As an American
judge, I frankly find many ICTY defense cross-examinations painfully
unhelpful to my own judgement. I have noticed how often the witnesses
seem to resent the cross-examinations and pull back into a litany of "don't
remembers." They see the defense counsel allied with their nemeses in the
docks. Several witnesses have at the end of their testimony addressed
concluding remarks to the defense counsel rather than the accused: "How
can you stand there and defend these men who have taken everything away
from us, our families, our health, our homeland?" In sum, I came away
from the two lengthy trials in which I have participated thinking that the
potential of cross-examination by defense counsel in the search for truth
105 Between 1996 and 1998, there were six cases in which defense counsel sought the
disqualification of ICTR judges. It does not appear that counsel raised this issue in any other cases
before or since in the ICTR. It should also be noted that nearly all of those instances between 1996 and
1998 involved multiple defendants that were tried together. Cases in which ICTR defense counsel
sought the disqualification of judges include: Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR 96-7; Prosecutor
v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR 97-24; Prosecutor v. Ngirumpatse, Case No. ICTR 97-28; Prosecutor v.
Ntabakuze, Case No. ICTR 97-30; Prosecutor v. Nzirorera, Case No. ICTR 98-38 (numerous requests
for judicial disqualification); and Prosecutor v Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR 98-44C.
106 Michael
Bohlander, The International Criminal Judiciary-The Problems of Judicial
Selection, Independence and Ethics, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 325, 383 (Michael Bohlander ed., 2007).
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has not been realized. 07
David Tolbert also observed that:
[D]efense counsel from the region are generally unfamiliar with the
adversarial system on which the ICTY's procedures are modeled and have
thus had difficulty with cross-examination and other aspects of advocacy.
Not only has this led to poor representation in certain cases but also to
delays in the proceedings, as these lawyers have struggled in an unfamiliar
system.'os
As noted by Judge Wald, the processes for training defense counsel in the
substantive content of humanitarian law cannot be an afterthought. The advent of
an organized defense bar has largely addressed this concern. Moreover, there is a
growing pool of younger Defence lawyers who have worked as Legal Assistants
and, due to an amendment in the ICTR Rules, can qualify as Defence Counsel after
7 years at the bar. These younger lawyers have had experience in the field, and
increasingly been able to earn advanced degrees specializing in international
criminal norms that simply were not offered to their predecessors. As will be
described in more detail below, the provisions for training and assisting defense
counsel have become an integral aspect of modem practice.
In addition, the study and dissemination of evidentiary jurisprudence has
become an indispensable dimension of defense practice. Counsel must balance the
ethical obligation to be "respectful and courteous"'. towards the bench with the
overarching professional duty to present available evidence in pursuit of a fair trial.
The inherent imprecision of previous evidentiary rulings by Chambers taking
decisions in widely varying factual circumstances and disparate geographical and
cultural contexts presents the defense with an increasing obligation to aggressively
litigate these issues. This, of course, includes the correlative duty to challenge
prosecutorial evidence as appropriate. As only one of many possible examples"' of
the sophisticated evidentiary inconsistencies that the defense teams now litigate, the
practice in the ICTY has held that the prosecution may tender "fresh evidence""'
during the cross-examination of defense witnesses, even when that evidence is
1o7 Patricia M. Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes
of
Age: Some Observations on Day to Day Dilemmas of an International Court, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y

87, 104-05 (2001).
1os

David Tolbert, The ICTY and Defense Counsel: A Troubled Relationship, 37 NEW ENG. L.

REv. 975, 979 (2003).
i0 ICC Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel, UN Doc. ICC-ASP/4/Res.1, art. 7(1) (Dec. 2,
2005) [hereinafter ICC Code of Conduct], http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ BD397ECF-8CA844EF-92C6-AB4BEBD55BE2/140121/ICCASP432ReslEnglish.pdf.
no See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Karadiid, Case No. IT-95-5/18-I, Motion for Reconsideration of
Decisions on Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts (Mar. 4, 2010) (discussing conflicting trends in the
jurisprudence related to adjudicated facts, especially following the Tolimir decision in the ICTY).
" "Fresh evidence" is defined as "material that was not included in the Prosecution Rule 65ter
list and not admitted during the Prosecution's case-in-chief but that is tendered by the Prosecution when
cross-examining Defence witnesses." Prosecutor v Prlid, Case No. IT-04-74-AR73.14, Decision on the
Interlocutory Appeal Against the Trial Chamber's Decision on Presentation of Documents by the
Prosecution in Cross-Examination of Defence Witnesses, 1 15 (Feb. 26, 2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/090226.pdf [hereinafter Prlid Appeal].
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inculpatory in nature and was not introduced during the prosecution's case-in-chief
In order to introduce such "fresh evidence," the prosecution must
demonstrate that such flexibility is "in the interests of justice."" 2 In theory, the
effort of the bench to aid an orderly disclosure to the defense and presentation of
evidence helps the defense to prepare for its own case in chief with a greater
confidence that an entirely new line of prosecutorial evidence will not materialize
during trial. In this regard, it must be noted that ICTY case law suggests a higher
burden for tendering inculpatory fresh evidence than for tendering fresh evidence
used solely for impeachment purposes."' The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prlid did
stress that such assessments must still be made on a case-by-case basis, "taking into
account both the probative value of that evidence and the need to ensure a fair
trial."ll 4 ICTY jurisprudence on the admission of inculpatory fresh evidence
requires balancing the probative value of the evidence against the fair trial rights of
the accused."' In Deli6, the Appeals Chamber held that the Trial Chamber erred in
not specifying the purpose for which the fresh evidence was admitted, and not
addressing how prejudice caused to the defense, if any, could be redressed. On
remand, the DeliW Trial Chamber reversed its decision to admit the fresh evidence
and expunged the exhibits from the record."' The Trial Chamber concluded that
admission of the fresh evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt of the
accused resulted in prejudice to the fair trial rights of the accused where the exhibits
were not disclosed to the defense until shortly before beginning cross-examination
of the witness.
According to the Prli6 Appeals Chamber, factors the Trial Chamber should
consider with regard to admitting inculpatory fresh evidence include the importance
of the document, the source of the document and when it was obtained, when the
document was disclosed to the defense, and why the document is being offered after
the conclusion of the prosecution's case."' The Appeals Chamber went on to
explain that Trial Chambers should balance the decision to admit fresh evidence
against the fair trial rights of the accused by considering the mode of disclosure of
the documents, the purpose of admission, the time elapsed between disclosure and
examination of the witness, languages known to counsel and the accused, any other
relevant factual considerations, and available measures to address any prejudice to
the defense."'
"' Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia R. P. & EVID. 85(A) [hereinafter ICTY RPE]; Prlid
Appeal, supra note I 11, T 23.
" E.g., Prli6 Appeal, supra note 111, 27; ("[T]he risk of prejudice caused by the admission of
fresh evidence probative of guilt is potentially greater as compared to fresh evidence admitted with the
sole purpose of impeaching the witness.") (citing to Prosecutor v. Delid, Case No. IT-04-83-AR73. 1,
Decision on Rasim Delia's Interlocutory Appeal Against Trial Chamber's Oral Decisions on Admission
of Exhibits 1316 and 1317, 1 22 (Apr. 15, 2008)); Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milogevid, Case No. IT-0254-T, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Reconsideration Regarding Evidence of Defence Witnesses
Mitar Balevic, Vladislav Jovanovic, Vukasin Andric, and Dobre Aleksovski, 21 (May 17, 2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan-milosevic/tdec/en/050517-3.htm (admitting fresh evidence where
the document was used for the "purpose of impeaching the credibility of the witness").
"14 Prlid Appeal, supra note 111,
23.
11 Prosecutor v. Kordid & derkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals Chamber Judgement, 222
(Dec. 17, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kordiccerkez/acjug/en/cer-ajO41217e.pdf.
116 Deli6, supra note 113,
6.
" Prli6 Appeal, supra note 111, $ 24.
11 Id. $
25.
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ICTR jurisprudence on the issue of fresh evidence is mixed," 9 despite the
fact that the permissible scope of cross-examination is identical to the standards
found in the ICTY Rules of Procedure.120 The SCSL has merged precedents from
the ICTY and ICTR to fashion a wholly new threshold by requiring the prosecutor
to establish "exceptional circumstances" warranting the admission of documents
offered only after the close of the prosecution's case.121
This line of cases shows the uncertainty and imprecision that defense
counsel face in making sometimes on the fly decisions whether to object, how to
preserve issues for appeal, and how best to balance the best interests of the
defendant with the obligation to serve as officers of the court while still preserving
personal relations with other counsel. Alert and professional defense counsel
cannot rely solely on an engaged and attentive bench to intercede when necessary to
ensure the rights of the defendant, hence counsel have adapted their conduct and
motions practice to the parameters of the mixed system that has developed today.
Observation of current evidentiary practice indicates that counsel are litigating
aggressively and expanding the jurisprudence in ways that benefit their clients.
As the discussion above shows, the impetus created by the fee splitting
scandals prompted significant organizational evolution. At present, the ad hoc
tribunal Registrars can refer a defense attorney seeking admission to the list of
counsel for interviews by a panel composed of judges, members of the Advisory
Board, and/or other qualified counsel. 12 2 In hindsight, the organizational
developments prompted by the perception of defense mismanagement during the
era of fee splitting in conjunction with the increasingly complex nature of the
procedural norms mark the maturation of the international defense bar. Indeed, at
the time of this writing, counsel are vigorously litigating evidentiary issues in
sophisticated ways that were not approximated in scale or tenacity a decade ago.
The surge in evidentiary activism became noticeably more intense in the 2002-03
period, which roughly coincides with what can be regarded as the as the turning
point in the emergence of a mature international defense bar. The 2002-03 window
approximates the halfway point of the life cycle of the ICTY and ICTR at the time
of this writing. It also represents the statistical peak in the number of ICTR cases in
which motions were made alleging defense noncompliance with court orders,'123 as

119 Compare Prosecutor v. Bagosora et. al., Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Decision on Severance or
Exclusion of Evidence Based on Prejudice Arising from Testimony of Jean Kambanda, 1 2 (Sept. 11,
2006),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CBagosora%5CTrail%20and%2OAppeal%5C 1109
06b.pdf, with Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-T, Decision on Admission of Documents
Used in Cross-Examination of Edouard Karemera and Witness 6 ("Karemera Decision"), T 4 (Nov. I1,
2009), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CKaremera%5Cdecisions%5CO911 1.pdf.
120 ICTY Rule of Procedure 90(H)(i) mirrors ICTR Rule 90(G)(i) by allowing questions related to
the subject-matter of the evidence-in-chief, credibility, and the subject-matter of the cross-examining
party's case.
121 Prosecution v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-1-T, Decision on Prosecution Motion in Relation to
the Applicable Legal Standards Governing the Use and Admission of Documents By the Prosecution
http://www.sc2009),
30,
(Nov.
27
T
Cross-Examination,
During
sI.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket-qPl2Cbm8OTA=&tabid=159.
122 DIXoN & KHAN, supra note 74, §
20-73.
123Prior to 2000, such motions were made in eight of fifty-six cases, representing a rate of 14.3%.
Subsequent to 2000, such allegations have been made in only one of twenty-three cases, for a rate of
4.3% (listing of the cases analyzed on file with author).
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well as those related to the replacement of counsel. 24 Juxtaposed against this
watershed period for organizational innovation, the following part will describe the
formation of the professional associations created to support defense counsel, as
well as the normative outlines of the current Code of Conduct for Defense Counsel
and the correlative creation of formal Defense Offices within the extant tribunals.
IV.

ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATIONS TO SUPPORT THE DEFENSE

Nothing in the London Charter specifically provided for the right to

defense counsel or anticipated the requirements that would necessarily inhere
towards counsel tasked with representing the defeated Nazi leaders.
Foreshadowing the spare prescriptions regarding the defense teams in the ad hoc
tribunals that would follow some half-century later, the Charter provided merely
that each defendant should get a "fair trial" and thus would be entitled to conduct
"his own defense before the Tribunal or to have the assistance of counsel."'25 For
all of the international attention and importance attached to the IMT, the provisions
for the defense displayed a remarkable lack of urgency. It was almost as if the
defense team was seen as ignoble and inconvenient, despite its central importance
to the fairness and perception of the overall proceedings. The German counsel were
given copies of the prosecution materials only five days prior to the start of trial,
and they spent the bulk of the proceedings crowded into a common area where there
were not even enough desks for each counsel and only one telephone line capable
of making long distance calls.'26 They each did their best to offer credible defense
lines of argument, all the while knowing that the indicted Nazi leaders faced the
combined political and legal weight of the victorious Allies. The prosecution team
provided support only grudgingly and after much delay and deliberation.
In many ways, the development of the international defense bar remained
frozen in time until the gradual accumulation of expertise and personal contacts
began to take root in the early days of the ICTY. By 2002, as noted above, there
had been a number of trials in each of the ad hoc tribunals, but inconsistent
organizational development towards supporting a maturing and rapidly coalescing
international defense bar. The shock of the fee splitting scandals highlighted the
124 Prior to 2000, such motions were made in nineteen of fifty-six cases, representing
a rate of
34%. Subsequent to 2000, such allegations have been made in none of twenty-three cases, for a rate of
0% (listing of the cases analyzed on file with author).
125 Charter
of
the
International
Military
Tribunal
art.
16,
available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp#artl6. The Charter provides:
In order to ensure fair trial for the Defendants, the following procedure shall be followed:
(a) The Indictment shall include full particulars specifying in detail the charges against the
Defendants. A copy of the Indictment and of all the documents lodged with the Indictment,
translated into a language which he understands, shall be furnished to the Defendant at reasonable
time before the Trial.
(b) During any preliminary examination or trial of a Defendant he will have the right to give any
explanation relevant to the charges made against him.
(c) A preliminary examination of a Defendant and his Trial shall be conducted in, or translated
into, a language which the Defendant understands.
(d) A Defendant shall have the right to conduct his own defense before the Tribunal or to have the
assistance of Counsel.
(e) A Defendant shall have the right through himself or through his Counsel to present evidence at
the Trial in support of his defense, and to cross-examine any witness called by the Prosecution.
126 Laternser, supra note 45, at 476.
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need for a coordinated organizational response that would galvanize the rhetoric of
equality of arms and fundamental fairness into a lasting reality. Though the
sophistication and trial techniques of the defense bar had improved dramatically in
the days since Nuremberg, the sense of many observers remained that defense
counsel were freelancing intermeddlers.
The organizational innovations in 2002 and 2003 mark a definitive turning
point in these attitudes (which to be fair were far from universally felt). The
organizational innovations described in this part established the system within
which the defense bar consolidated its vital role in the system of international
criminal justice. In effect, the formation of professional associations, which could
advise and evaluate the performance of counsel against the standard of Professional
Codes of Conduct, solidified the role of the defense teams as a coequal component
of the system. Similarly, the creation of Defense Offices within the tribunals
became the gold standard for supporting the work of the defense and sustaining its
efforts to investigate and develop defense perspectives. As a result of these
changes, the defense bar enjoyed a refrained and refocused status within the
organizational structures of the emerging international system for criminal
accountability. The defense should never again be stereotyped as an ignoble and
inconvenient afterthought; rather the organizational structure supported a functional
and flexible defense bar that was rightly viewed as indispensable for the proper
administration of justice.
A. The Association ofInternationalDefense Counsel

In September 2002, the Association of Defense Counsel (ADC) was
officially formed in The Hague for the stated purpose of, inter alia, supporting the
"function, efficiency and independence of Defense Counsel" practicing before the
ICTY.127 Prior to this time, there were "well documented cases of institutional
hostility," and some of the limitations imposed upon the defense undermined "the
idea of any level playing field as between the defense and prosecution and strike at
the heart of professional effective representation." 28 The role and formation of the
ADC grew out of the judges' plenary session held in July 2002.129 It represented
another effort by judges to help ensure equality of arms through an active
engagement with and support to organized and effective defense efforts.
Unlike their counterparts in the ICTR, the judges amended the ICTY Rules
of Procedure to require membership in the ADC for any counsel who would appear
before the court.o The ICTR organization is similar in design and purpose, but
more informal and hence less well funded. It is noteworthy that neither
127

Press Release, Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Association of Defense Counsel

Formally Recognized by the ICTY (Dec. 1, 2002) (on file with author); see also Association of
Defense Counsel, http://www.adcicty.org (last visited May 30, 2011) (documenting the establishment
of the ADC effective Sept. 20, 2002).
123 Howard Morrison, Practice at the Ad Hoc Tribunalsfor the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in
THE POSITION OF THE DEFENCE AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE ROLE OF THE
NETHERLANDS AS THE HOST STATE 39, 45 (Martine Hallers et al. eds., 2002).
129 Comprehensive ICTY Report, supra note 70,
44.
130 ICTY RPE, supra note 112, R. 44(A). Of course, in the context of internationalized tribunals

at the domestic level, counsel will always be members of the domestic professional organization and
subject to the professional codes of that local bar.
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organization derives any funding from the Tribunal, which is a perfectly logical
solution to avoid any appearance of undue influence or conflicts of interest. The
ICTR counterpart was actually established prior to the ADC, in March 2002, and is
known as the "Association des Advocats de la Defense" (ADAD). 13' Both defense
organizations created disciplinary councils to assist in self-policing the
professionalism of the Defense ranks. In its first months, the ADC removed one
counsel on ethical grounds, thereby removing that lawyer's ability to practice
before the ICTY. 3 2 In contrast, the ADAD has itself been dogged by allegations of
ethical improprieties and has been strikingly unsuccessful in representing Defense
Counsel in fee disputes with the Registry. Though the ADAD has been less
effective in practice than its ICTY equivalent, both organizations share the common
goal of promoting the efforts of the defense by buttressing members' advocacy
skills, knowledge of international criminal law, and ability to take advantage of
available resources and jurisprudential collections.
Significantly, both organizations have met with Tribunal officials on
occasion to help resolve the problems encountered by the defense in the
performance of its functions. As an integral aspect of the organizational model, the
monitoring and enforcement of the Codes of Conduct for Defense Counsel have
been among the most important actions of these organizations. If nothing else, they
provide a reliable and ready resource to educate and inform defense counsel,
particularly those from the affected region or those who have minimal experience in
the international criminal justice system. These functions were performed only on
an informal and scattershot basis prior to 2002.
Finally, the defense organizations have been an anchor point for a maturing
defense bar in part because they helped to stiffen the ethical spine of counsel
through the oversight of peers and a functioning disciplinary council. Of perhaps
more lasting import, they serve as a clearing house and support center for counsel.
They are the repository for the emerging best practices which in turn aids the
process of transmitting the lessons learned from experience and the hard knocks of
litigation to a new generation of practitioners. The defense organizations provide
an indispensable resource for opinions, perspectives, and model motions and briefs.
By extension, the defense organizations provide the readily identifiable portal
through which pro bono assistance, training support, and relevant expertise flows to
trial teams as needed. In short, they have dramatically facilitated the process of
ensuring that the defense bar incorporates the broader pattern of jurisprudential
developments in a systematic way across trials and jurisdictions.
B. The Codes of ProfessionalConductfor Counsel

The detailed Codes of Professional Conduct for Counsel provide the ethical
compass for the international criminal defense bar. Every extant tribunal has
adopted such a Code. Close and comparative examination of the codes reveals a
complex potpourri of procedure and presumption that makes the disciplinary codes
truly lex specialis. The lex specialis nature of the ethical system applicable to the
1'

See
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INTERNATIONAL POUR LE RWANDA, http://www.adadictr.org (last visited May 30, 2011).
132 Comprehensive ICTY Report, supra note
70, T 45.
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conduct of counsel is, of course, entirely consistent with the sui generis nature of
the evidentiary standards and procedural practices in the modem accountability
system.'
As a consequence, it is wholly unsurprising that the best practice for
counsel requires counsel to "maintain a high level of competence in the law
applicable" to these complex cases and to participate in ongoing training to
"maintain such competence." 34 Detailed explication of each provision of the Codes
of Conduct in relation to each other and the broader fabric of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence that operate in conjunction with each Code is beyond the
scope of this article, and would be duplicative of other scholarship in any event.'
When evaluating the evolution of the defense bar, the important point is that the
Codes of Conduct apply to all counsel practicing before the bench. The ICC Code
of Conduct for Counsel, for example, defines the term "counsel" to include
"defence counsel, counsel acting for States, amici curiae, and counsel or legal
representatives for victims and witnesses practicing before the International
Criminal Court."3 6 A mature defense bar is therefore bound together with all other
counsel as an integrated and indispensable element of the whole. This development
represents the pinnacle of systematized integration in that it signals that the defense
is not an inconvenient afterthought.
The Codes of Conduct-the hallmark of professional growth and
systematic integration- are supported both by the enforcement power of the bench
and the oversight authority of the professional organizations noted above.
However, as Jenia Turner has noted:
[i]n international criminal trials, attorneys face new and potentially more
complex ethical dilemmas. The goals of international trials are broader and
more political than those of ordinary domestic trials, and the applicable
procedures are a unique hybrid of the inquisitorial and adversarial
traditions. Yet existing Codes of Conduct fail to take into account these
special features of the international criminal justice system and often fail to
offer adequate guidance to attorneys.'3

See supra notes 77-109 and accompanying text.
134ICC Code of Conduct, supra note 109, art. 7(2).
13 See, e.g., Claus Kress, The Procedural Law of the International Criminal Law in Outline:
Anatomy of a Unique Compromise, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 603 (2003); Judith A. McMorrow, Creating
Norms of Attorney Conduct in International Tribunals: A Case Study of the ICTY, 30 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 139 (2007); Alphons Orie, Accusatorial v Inquisitorial Approach in International
Criminal Proceedings Prior to the Establishment of the ICC and in Proceedings Before the ICC, in
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1439 (Cassese et al.
eds., 2d ed. 2008); Daniel Nsereko, Ethical Obligations of Counsel in Criminal Proceedings:
Representing an Unwilling Client, 12 CRIM. L.F. 487, 501 (2001); JARINDE TUINSTRA, DEFENCE
COUNSEL ININTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2009).
136 ICC Code of Conduct, supra note 109, art. 1; see also International Criminal Bar Code, supra
note 6, arts. 3-5 (emphasizing independence, honesty and integrity, and competence rather than zealous

advocacy); id. art. 28 ("In rendering advice [to the client], counsel may refer not only to law but to
other considerations such as moral, reputational, economic, social, and political factors that may be
relevant to the client's situation"); id. art 49(2) (taking an inquisitorial tack by specifying that counsel
"may refuse to offer evidence that counsel reasonably believes is false, irrelevant, or lacks probative
value").
137Jenia lontcheva Turner, Legal Ethics in International Criminal Defense, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L.
685, 686 (2010).
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Over time, the guidance of the various judicial chambers in the growing
body of jurisprudence and the oversight of the professional organizations have
begun to guide the expectations and practices of experienced counsel. For example,
rather than requiring attorneys to act zealously or aggressively in serving the best
interests of the client, the ICC Code of Conduct adopts language that would be
expected in a typical inquisitorial system by requiring only that attorneys take a
"solemn undertaking" that they will perform their duties with "integrity and
diligence, honourably, freely, independently, expeditiously, and conscientiously."'
Nevertheless, as the eelebii Appeals Judgment (and many others) demonstrate,
counsel must be aggressive to recognize and respond to events during trial that
threaten to erode the rights of the defendant rather than relying on the Trial
Chamber to intervene. In practice, defense attorneys must take more of an
adversarial approach to their work in court than the Code might require on its face.
Even so, there are many anecdotal instances in which collegiality and cooperation
in open court is the norm between counsel. In the Los Palos case in the Special
Panels, for example, the Timorese defense attorney helpfully explained a local
cultural tradition to defuse a frustrating and prolonged exchange between the
prosecution and a witness who refused to admit that the victim was on a bus

"because of a cultural tradition where you cannot mention dead people."'
Therefore, in the realm of ethical constraints and obligations intertwined
within the practice of international criminal law, one truism is stark and
unavoidable: The inquisitorial or adversarial roots of a particular rule have long
since approached irrelevance because the system is designed from the ground up as
Phrased another way, the procedural rules and the
a unique structure.
accompanying Code of Conduct applicable to modern international criminal
practice refer to themes that are designed to operate smoothly within a defined
jurisprudential context. As a result, though there is anecdotal evidence from
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and East Timor that the primary concern of victims was to
see trials move quickly, that goal is subordinated to the procedural and ethical
constraints on counsel. Likewise, the larger aspiration to fully documenting the
history of each conflict and situation for the benefit of scholars and a complete
historical record is normally held hostage to the principles and practices of the Code
as it is implemented in practice before real judges applying real law. From this
perspective, the Codes of Conduct for Defense Counsel represent the pinnacle of
professional maturity because they represent a "truly mixed procedure [that]
requires prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges who have the knowledge of both
common and civil law and are able to look beyond their own legal systems." 40 The
exercise of professional competence in such a holistic and integrated system is thus
the sine qua non of a mature and competent international defense bar.

ICC Code of Conduct, supra note 109, art 5.
13 Combs, supra note 35, at 253 (citing Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Los Palos Case
Notes, at 33, July 18, 2001).
13

140 Kai Ambos, The Structure of International Criminal Procedure: 'Adversarial,' 'Inquisitorial'
or Mixed?, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS AND

PROCEDURES 429 (Michael Bohlander ed., 2007).
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C. The Creation of the Defense Office-Its Roles and Responsibilities

The establishment of Defense Offices as a co-equal component of the
organizational structure of modem tribunals represents the most visible
organizational innovation marking the maturation of the international criminal
defense bar. During the early years of the ad hoc tribunals, the Office of the
Prosecutor was closely aligned with the other formal branches simply by virtue of
the organizational structure. At the IMT, the provisions for supporting the efforts
of defense attorneys were barely adequate as defense attorneys were crammed into
one noisy room with too few desks, and the provisions for even modest payments
were made only after great effort and time had passed. 14 ' Decades later, just as the
London Charter had been silent regarding a formal structure for supporting defense
efforts, the Security Council did not include such a provision in establishing the
ICTY and ICTR. In the words of David Tolbert, the very physical layout of the
ICTY in its infancy "with the Prosecutor and Court located cheek by jowl and
defense counsel situated generally off site, there is perhaps a metaphor for where
the defense fits into the scheme of things." 42 One of the collateral benefits of the
shift towards a lump sum payment system for defense was to permit teams to rent
space nearby to the ICTY. .
However, the continuing necessity for an established organizational
support structure supporting the work of defense teams on myriad issues led to the
establishment of what was termed the Defence Counsel Unit, which was renamed
as the Office of Legal Aid and Detention Matters (OLAD) in 2002.143 Though
OLAD reports to the Deputy Registrar of the Tribunal, OLAD and the ADC
quickly became important partners on behalf of defense trial teams coordinating
suitable office space, research facilities, document storage areas, and working space
inside the Court.'" Today, defense counsel have access to private areas within the
court that can be used during recesses and for meetings, and they have full access to
the other organs of the court with whom coordination is required. The ICTY
Manual on Developed Practices recognizes that the access of defense teams within
the physical court space helps to "increase efficiency and help integrate the defence
who were kept at a distance and isolated during the earlier years."l4' Though it
services more than 500 defense team members per year in cases in pretrial, trial and
appellate proceedings, OLAD has been conflicted in its work by its dual
responsibility to aid the defense while also administering the financial aspects of
assessing indigence, assigning counsel to indigent defendants, and providing
payments to counsel representing defendants.14 6 The duality of responsibilities has
141ANN TUSA & JOHN TUSA, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 215-17 (1985).
142 Tolbert,

supra note 108, at 976.

143See Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Seventh Annual Report of the International

Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed on the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, 1 229, U.N. Doc.
A/55/273-S/2000/777 (July 26, 2000).
4 DIXON & KHAN, supra note 74, §20-24.
145ICTY-UNICRI,
ICTY
Manual
on
Developed
Practices
211
(2009),

http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/manual_developedpractices/icty_m
anual on developedpractices.pdf.
146 See Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Sixteenth Annual Report of the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
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created tensions between OLAD and defense counsel, while creating clouds of
suspicion among attorneys that OLAD is not an unbiased source of assistance.147
In the ICTR context, the Defence Counsel and Detention Management
Section (DCMS) was established as early as 1997 under the Registry. Just as in the
ICTY, the DCMS was charged with supervising the administrative and logistical
tasks of supporting defense teams; just as in the ICTY, the professional
organization (ADAD described above) evolved as a gap-filler to provide concrete
support and technical assistance alongside the institutional work of the DCMS. In
contrast, the SCSL corollary was created with a substantive role on the model of the
public defenders in domestic systems. Its responsibility is to provide advice,
assistance and representation to suspects and accused, and the role of the Principal
Defender was intended to act independently despite its technical subordination to
the Registrar.148 In fact, the First Annual SCSL Report described the Office as the
"fourth pillar" of the Court and specified the aspiration that the Office would in
time "become as fully independent as the OTP [Office of the Prosecutor]." 49 Thus,
the relevant SCSL Rule of Procedure's obligates the Public Defender to provide,
inter alia,
(i) initial legal advice and assistance by duty counsel who shall be situated
within a reasonable proximity to the Detention Facility and the seat of the
Special Court and shall be available as far as practicable to attend the
Detention Facility in the event of being summoned;
(ii) legal assistance as ordered by the Special Court in accordance with
Rule 61, if the accused does not have sufficient means to pay for it, as the
interests of justice may so require;
(iii) adequate facilities for counsel in the preparation of the defence.
The posture of independence led counsel to view the office as a partner and
source of valuable assistance at critical junctures of the proceedings rather than an
administrative extension of the Registrar with an untenable mandate and potentially
shifting loyalties."' On the other hand, the very innovation of the SCSL Defence
Office created the likelihood of serious conflicts of interest among staff attorneys
working on the prototypical tribunal case; i.e., one with multiple defendants whose
interests overlap and often collide as they confront inherently interrelated charges
Humanitarian Law Committed on the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, p. 4, U.N. Doc.
A/64/205-S/2009/394 (July 26, 2000).
147Gu6nael Mettraux & A. Cengic, The Role of A Defence Office-Some Lessons From Recent
and not so Recent War Crimes Precedents, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 391, 402 (Michael Bohlander ed., 2007).
148 WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA, AND SIERRA LEONE 615 (2006).
149 Special Court for Sierra Leone President, First Annual Report of the President of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone for the Period 2 December 2002-1 December 2003, p. 16 (2003),
http://www.sc-si.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket-NRhDcbHrcSs%3d&tabid= 176 (last visited May 30,
2011).
1so Special Court for Sierra Leone R. P. & EVID., R. 45B.
'' Mettraux, supra note 147, at 421.
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arising from the same set of complex events amidst shifting theories of individual
liability. In practice, duty counsel at the SCSL became careful to avoid being made
privy to "any attorney-client confidences or, indeed, to any information about the
defence(s) that will be raised by an accused at trial."' 52
At the ICC, the Office of Public Counsel for the Defence (OPCD)
represents the pinnacle of organizational evolution designed to support rather than
supplant the work of a mature international defense bar. The Registrar is
specifically obligated to ensure that the Office fulfills its functions in such a manner
as to "ensure the professional independence of defence counsel""' and encouraged
to solicit advice and assistance as appropriate from "any independent representative
body of counsel or legal associations." 54 Given the imperative of providing a fair
trial in the ICC, the OPCD is charged with facilitating the protection of
confidentiality while working to provide "support, assistance, and information to all
defence counsel appearing before the Court and, as appropriate, support for
professional investigators necessary for the efficient and effective conduct of the
defence.""5 Just as in other tribunals, the OPCD will assist arrested persons in
obtaining the assistance of legal counsel, will provide counsel with necessary
facilities, and (uniquely among extant tribunals) will facilitate "dissemination of
information and case law of the Court to defence counsel" and "cooperate with
national defence and bar associations or any independent representative body of
counsel and legal associations . . . to promote the specialization and training of
lawyers in the law of the Statute and the Rules."' The very early indicators are
that the OPCD has filled a vital gap in the practice of the ICC. Indeed, because the
OPCD is active in "representing and protecting the rights of the Defence during the
initial stages of an investigation" Pre-Trial Chamber I emphatically rejected
assertions by the ad hoc counsel appointed in the Darfur case that he was obligated
by the Code of Professional Conduct to challenge the admissibility of the case.
On the other hand, the organizational innovation of the OPCD is not a panacea as
the culture of the ICC has in some ways reverted to the Nuremberg era as the
Defence offices are located in a separate building on Saturnestraat, away from the
main Arc building that houses the majority of the Court and, more significantly, the
courtrooms. This has literally led to situations of Defence teams running through
the snow back to the Defence office during court breaks in order to use
photocopiers (to which they have no access in the Arc building) or access their
files.
In the modem system of international criminal law, the role of the defense
152 John

Jones et al., The Special Courtfor Sierra Leone: A Defence Perspective,2 J. INT'L CRIM.

JUST. 211, 214 (2004).
1s3 ICC RPE, supra note 51, R. 20(2).
154ICC RPE, supra note 51, R. 20(3).
1 ICC RPE, supra note 51, R. 20(1).
156 id.
1

Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Decision on the Ad hoc Counsel for the Defence's Request for

leave to Appeal the Decision of 2 February 2007, (Feb. 21, 2007) (characterizing the ad hoc counsel's
arguments as a "flagrant disregard" of the relevant ICC authorities); see also, Situation in Darfur,
Sudan, URGENT Decision on Request for leave to appeal the Decision on the Requests of the OPCD
on the Production of Relevant Supporting Documentation Pursuant to Regulation 86(2)(e) of the
Regulations of the Court and on the Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials by the Prosecutor, Doc. No.
ICC-02/05-118 (Jan. 23, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc412098.PDF (last visited May
30,2011).
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office as an independent organ of the Court is the necessary organizational
companion to a fully mature international defense bar. The failures of the Defense
Lawyer's Unit in the Special Panels demonstrate that the creation of a bureaucratic
office cannot preserve equality of arms without sufficient funding, staff support,
and substantive expertise."' If nothing else, the organizational innovation of the
defense office erodes the cultural gap and psychological division between the
defense team and the court (meaning the prosecutors, registry, and chambers).
From another perspective, the holistic development of a modem structure coincides
with the maturation of a modern defense bar that is fully capable of advocating in
the modern milieu. The part that follows will document the empirical indications
supporting the assertion that defendants receive assistance from a mature
international defense bar that, despite its imperfections and occasional
inadequacies, provides rough procedural parity with the prosecution.
V. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF A MATURING DEFENSE BAR
The significant organizational innovations discussed above since the
World War II era in conjunction with the increased focus of an activist judiciary in
managing the performance of the defense and the reasonably proportionate use of
available courtroom time suggest the emergence of a functional, if imperfect,
equality of arms. However, theoretical equality would mean little if the actual
practice of courts and counsel did not evidence an accompanying professional
maturation. Closer examination of the thickets of motions and rulings by tribunals
over the past decade demonstrates strong empirical indicators that defendants in
fact receive high quality defense efforts even in the face of complex legal theories
and extraordinarily difficult factual contexts. In other words, despite the inherent
challenges faced by the defense, the modern defense teams operate within the
organizational confines of the internationalized and ad hoc tribunals to produce a
rough but resilient equality of arms.
A. The EvidentiaryBattles

Access to information in the preparation of the defense case is an essential
element of equality of arms. On occasion, the lack of fair and timely access to
information may even represent the single most troubling aspect of the international
criminal justice system. Defense efforts to obtain information held by sovereign
states, non-governmental entities, or international organizations have proven to be
one of the most enduring challenges confronted since the IMT."' Nevertheless, the
maturation of the defense bar is easily recognizable in the tactics and tenacity
displayed in developing a substantial body of jurisprudence relevant to access to
evidence. The fierce litigation over access to available evidence provides potent
158 Jarinde Temminck Tuinstra, Defending the Defenders: The Role of Defence
Counsel in
International Criminal Tribunals, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 463, 484 (2010) (discussing the dysfunction
of the Defence Lawyer's Unit in East Timor due in part to a lack of resources for investigations, legal
research, and necessary expertise).
159See, e.g., Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and
Prospects, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 111, 131 (2002).
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illustration of the overall competence of the organized defense teams in the extant
tribunals.
The statutes of the ICTY and ICTR permit the tribunals to issue orders of
cooperation to states because the tribunals were established pursuant to Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter." However, there are many reasons why a state or other entity
may decline to voluntarily cooperate with defendants on a timely basis. In some
instances, a key political leader may have personal motives for seeking the
conviction of a particular defendant. In others, domestic officials may seek to avoid
the appearance of assisting (alleged) war criminals to appease domestic
constituencies. The Blaskic trial provided the prototypical example following his
conviction and 40 year sentence handed down on March 3, 2000. After the death of
the Croatian president, the government announced that it would turn potentially
exculpatory information over to the Blaskic defense. Blaskic filed over 8,000 pages
of additional evidence with the ICTY Appeals Chamber, which in turn reduced his
sentence to nine years."' The battles over access to evidence demonstrate the
maturity and tenacity of defense teams more than any other dimension of current
practice. Ultimately, if a state truly wishes to withhold information-as in the
Blaskic case-there is little the tribunals can do because they lack true coercive
power over states. The ad hoc tribunals can merely report non-compliance to the
Security Council and hope that it will act.162
Most states under most circumstances are willing to help both the
prosecution and the defense. At the same time, states have legitimate national
security concerns and labyrinthine security infrastructures that must be addressed
appropriately. Many international organizations seek protections for their personnel
in the field who may be asked to appear as witnesses. In particular, one of the
essential premises of the international criminal justice system is that the need for
access to information by both the prosecution and defense must be constrained at
times by the imperative to protect the safety of human sources and the
confidentiality of sensitive information such as data collection capabilities.'
Moreover, states and organizations often have limited human and bureaucratic
resources, and simply cannot respond to every information request from the
tribunals. To diminish security concerns, the tribunals have adopted safeguards
such as the use of in camera and ex parte proceedings.'64 To minimize both security
concerns and the practical burden on states, there are various threshold
requirements that must be met before a tribunal will issue a formal order of
cooperation. These requirements are the main subject of this sub-part.
60 ICTY Statute, supra note 41, art. 29; ICTR Statute, supra note 41, art. 28; see also Prosecutor
v. Simba, Case No. ICTR 01-76-T, Decision on Matters Related to Witness KDD's Judicial Dossier, T
9 (Nov. 1, 2004).
16'

Gregory Gordon, Toward an International Criminal Procedure: Due Process Aspirations and

Limitations, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 635, 677-79 (2007).
162Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-PT, Judgement on the Request of the Republic of
Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, T 33 (Oct. 29, 1997); see also
Prosecutor v. Nizeyimana, supra note 38, 1 7 ("it appears from the available information that the
charges against Peter Erlinder are partly related to his submissions before the Tribunal during the
Military I case. The issue whether to bring the matter before the Security Council with reference to
Articles 28 and 29(4) of the Statute is presently being considered by the President of the Tribunal.").
163 Prosecutor v. Milutinovid, Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Decision on Second Application of
Dragoljub Ojdanid for Binding Orders Pursuant to Rule 54bis, 1$ 7, 9 (Nov. 17, 2005).
164 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 162, 1 67.

47:379

STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

418

Many information requests are submitted to and fulfilled by states
independent of any court process,"' but frequently states and intergovernmental
organizations such as NATO either cannot or will not comply. The defense may
then request the trial chamber to issue a binding order of cooperation to the
uncooperative state. This sub-part analyzes the details of and trends surrounding
such motions. For this analysis, seventy-three decisions on motions for orders of
cooperation from the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC were surveyed. Of these, thirty-three
motions were granted in full,"'6 twelve motions were granted in part and denied in
part, and twenty-three motions were denied in full. Four motions were either
withdrawn or complied with willingly by the state. 67

Table 1 below describes the reasons for denial and the number of motions
denied for each (note that some motions are denied for multiple reasons):
Table 1:

Reason for Denial

Number
of Motions

Insufficient showing of relevance

12 (3)

(information sought deemed irrelevant)

Insufficient showing of prior efforts to
obtain information independently

12

or prior efforts not shown to be unsuccessful

Insufficiently specific request
Subpoena deemed unnecessary;

7
2

order requesting cooperation issued instead

Defense failed to make a proper

1

request for a deposition

Information could be obtained

1

McIntyre, supranote 47, at 277.
See Information Sharing Annex, Appendix A, for a complete listing of the citations for these
decisions. Note that two countries, Belgium and Austria, generally require a court order to comply with
a request for cooperation because of domestic law (or because of state policy in relation to requests for
interviews with military officers), which has a sort of artificial inflation effect on the number of
motions granted. See Prosecutor v. Karadiid, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Decision on the Accused's
Application for Binding Order Pursuant to Rule 54bis (Austria), 3 (Oct. 15, 2009); Prosecutor v.
Bagosora, Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Decision on Request to the Kingdom of Belgium for Assistance
Pursuant to Article 28 of the Statute, 4 (Apr. 21, 2006) (motion by Nsengiyumva); Prosecutor v.
Bagosora, Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Decision on Request to the Kingdom of the Netherlands for
Cooperation and Assistance, 1 9 (Feb. 7, 2005) (motion by Bagosora referring to state policy about
interviews with military officers).
Prosecutor v. Milutinovid, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Decision on Luki6 Defence Motions for
Admission of Documents from Bar Table, T 105-14 (June 11, 2008) (motion by Lukic); Prosecutor v.
Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-T, Order for Dismissal of Motion for Cooperation of RwandaStatements of Witness ANU (Nov. 7, 2007) (motion by Nzirorera); Prosecutor v. Milutinovid, Case No.
IT-05-87-PT, Order confirming Ojdanid withdrawal of request for rule 54bis order to government of
United Kingdom (Feb. 9, 2007) (motion by Ojdanid).
16s

66
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through other means
Insufficient grounds to recall the witness
No reasons for denial given
Production of material might

419

1
1
1

endanger a witness

Request made to wrong country/organization
Requested state not

1
1

a member of the United Nations

The first three reasons for denial listed in the table merit close attention
because of their recurring nature. The last eight reasons for denial will not be
discussed because there are no demonstrable trends that would undermine
confidence in the ability of the defense bar. In other words, mistakes happen, such
as assuming a particular country has certain documents when they are held
elsewhere. The next sub-parts will examine the jurisprudential prerequisites for the
issuance of orders of cooperation.
1. Prerequisitesfor Issuance of Orders of Cooperation

In the ICTY and ICTR, there are three prerequisites to obtain a binding
order of cooperation. First, the request for information must be sufficiently specific
to allow the requested country to identify the material sought. Second, the
requesting party must show that the requested material is relevant to at least one
issue in the trial, and that the material is necessary for a fair determination of the
matter. Finally, the requesting party must show the court that it has acted with due
diligence by attempting to secure the State's cooperation independently of court
process.
The first prerequisite is that a party requesting an order of cooperation must
show that its request is sufficiently specific to allow the requested government to
identify the material sought. The Blaskic Appeals Chamber specified that a request
"must identify specific documents and not broad categories. In other words,
documents must be identified as far as possible and in addition be limited in
number." 16' Because of fairness concerns, where the party cannot provide specific
details such as names, dates, and places, it may omit them provided it explains the
reasons for such omissions. However, the requesting party must still provide
sufficient information for the requested state to be able to identify the material to be
able to disclose it to the requesting party.o70
Of the seventy-three decisions surveyed, seven were denied in part or in

168ICTY RPE, supra note 112, R. 54bis(A); Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case
No. ICTR 98-44-T,
Decision on Motions for Order for Production of Documents by the Government of Rwanda and for
Consequential Orders, 7 (Feb. 13, 2006); Prosecutor v. Milutinovi6, Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Decision
on Second Application of Dragoljub Ojdanid for Binding Orders Pursuant to Rule 54bis (Nov. 17,
2005) (motion by Ojdanid); Prosecutor v. Hadfihasanovid & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47, Decision on
Defence Motion for Access to EUMM Archives, T 6 (Dec. 15, 2003) (motion by Hadlihasanovid).
169Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 162, 32.
170Prosecutor v. Milutinovi6, Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Decision on Application of Dragoljub
Ojdanid for Binding Orders Pursuant to Rule 54bis, T 8 (Mar. 23, 2005) (motion by Ojdani6).
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full because the defense failed to specifically identify the requested materials."' In
this context, there are two common mistakes made by defense counsel. The first,
and most obvious but easily remedied, is the use of overly broad categories lacking
sufficient identifying information such as dates, names, places, etc. The requests
also tend to lack a sufficient explanation for the failure to provide the necessary
identifying information.
Two consecutive decisions in the Ojdanid case provide an excellent
illustration of this mistake. Counsel for Ojdani6 initially asked the court to issue an
order of cooperation to NATO, its member states, and six other states for
documentation and recordings of intercepted communications involving General
Ojdani6. Part A of the initial request read as follows:
(A) All recordings, summaries, notes, or text of any intercepted
communications (electronic, oral, or written) during the period I
January through 20 June 1999, to which General Dragoljub Ojdani6 was

a party;172
The trial chamber ordered the defense to reformulate the request because it
failed to specify the date and place of the communications, and did not specifically
describe the relevance of the communications to Ojdanid's criminal responsibility
or any other issues in the trial. 7 1
The request excerpted above is an excellent illustration of why the
tribunals impose the specificity requirement. Requiring an organization like NATO
(not to mention the requested states) to find all documentation of intercepted
communications that involved Ojdanid within a six month period would likely
impose a heavy burden. It is conceivable that an organization like NATO might
have hundreds or thousands of relevant items mentioning or referring to Ojdani6
within the specified period, given its involvement in Kosovo. Even if it had only a
limited number of relevant materials, sorting through six months' worth of
materials derived from a variety of collection techniques and scattered across an
array of units and bureaucratic cubbyholes would be an unduly onerous task.
Moreover, the disclosure of such a broad category of materials might also endanger
the security of the requested party and its officials and sources. At a minimum,
17 Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, Case No. ICTR 99-50-T, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza's Motion
Regarding Cooperation with the Republic of Burundi, T 8 (Oct. 30, 2008) (motion by Mugiraneza);
Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Request to the Government of Rwanda for
Cooperation and Assistance Pursuant to Article 28 of the Statute, 5 (Mar. 10, 2004) (motion by
Bagosora); Prosecutor v. Hadlihasanovid & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47, Decision on Defence Access
to EUMM Archives p. 2 (Sept. 12, 2003) (motion by Hadlihasanovid); Prosecutor v. Milutinovid, Case
No. IT-05-87-PT, Decision on Application of Dragoljub Ojdani6 for Binding Orders Pursuant to Rule
54bis, p. 6 (Mar. 23, 2005) (motion by Ojdanik); Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-T,
Decision on Motions for Order for Production of Documents by the Government of Rwanda and for
Consequential Orders, J 8 (Feb. 13, 2006) (motion by Nzirorera); Prosecutor v. Nzirorera, Case No.
ICTR 98-44-1, Decision on the Request to the Governments of the United States of America, Belgium,
France, and Germany for Cooperation, p. 2 (Sept. 4, 2003); Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR
98-44-T, Decision on Defence Motion for Further Order to Obtain Documents in Possession of
Government of Rwanda, $ 11 (Nov. 27, 2006) (motion by Nzirorera) (second of three Nov. 27, 2006,
decisions).
172 Prosecutor v. Milutinovid, Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Decision on Application of Dragoijub
Ojdanid for Binding Orders Pursuant to Rule 54bis, p. 2 (Mar. 23, 2005).
1
Id. at 7-8.
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defense counsel should realize that the mobilization of bureaucratic resources and
political will to locate and provide available information is not inexhaustible. The
reformulated defense request read as follows:
(A) Copies of all recordings, summaries, notes or text of any intercepted
communications (electronic, oral, or written) during the period 1 January
1999 and 20 June 1999 in which General Dragoljub Ojdani6 was a party
and which:
(1) General Ojdani6 participated in the communication from Belgrade,
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
(2) the communication was with one of the persons listed in
Attachment 'A' [a list of 23 people attached to the Second
Application];
(3) may be relevant to one of the following issues in the case:
(a) General Ojdanid's knowledge or participation in the intended
or actual deportation of Albanians from Kosovo or lack thereof;
(b) General Ojdanid's knowledge or participation in the intended
or actual killing of civilians in Kosovo or lack thereof;
(c) whether the formal chain of command on matters pertaining to
Kosovo was respected within the FRY or Serbian government;
(d) General Ojdanid's efforts to prevent and punish war crimes in

Kosovo or lack thereof.174
The trial chamber deemed this part of the reformulated request sufficiently
specific because it was limited (1) in time, (2) to communications to which Ojdani6
was a party, and (3) to communications that involved a list of twenty-three people.
Although the defense did not identify the exact dates and places of specific
communications, the court found the parameters reasonable because of the lapse of
time since the communications had transpired and the likelihood that Ojdanid's
memory of specific times and places had faded.
In addition to giving as many specifics as possible, defense counsel should
use precise language. The Nzirorera Trial Chamber echoed many other judicial
rulings by rejecting overly broad defense motions and remonstrating counsel that
In the
the defense "appear[ed] to be engaged in a fishing expedition."'
Mugiraneza case at the ICTR, the trial chamber narrowed an information request
because the defense requested documents showing the arrival of persons in a certain
174 Prosecutor v. Milutinovid, Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Decision on Second Application
of
Dragoljub Ojdani6 for Binding Orders Pursuant to Rule 54bis, T 1 (Nov. 17, 2005).
17 Prosecutor v. Nzirorera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-1, Decision on the
Request to the Governments
of the United States of America, Belgium, France, and Germany for Cooperation (Sept. 4, 2003).
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city "on or about 12 April 1994," instead of specifying a specific date or date range
(i.e., April 10-15). Though the defense had identified the category of requested
documents with enough specificity, the trial chamber felt that the "on or about"
language was vague and that "reasonable minds could differ" on the exact date
range to which the request referred. While not denying the request outright, the
chamber limited it to documents showing arrivals on April 12 only."'
A variant of the failure to provide sufficient specificity arose in two cases
where, instead of attempting to identify specific material or narrow categories of
material, defense attorneys requested general, unfettered access to the archives of a
state or international organization so the attorneys themselves could locate and
obtain the desired documents. In the Bagosora case, the court said: "Previous
requests for broad categories of documents from the archives of a State have been
rejected by this Tribunal . ... Requests to inspect archives are equally inappropriate

and over-broad, particularly absent any showing that inspections are necessary to
obtain the documents.""' Though it might address the underlying imbalance of
access that has existed since the IMT, permitting outside individuals to have
unlimited access to archives could well compromise an array of sensitive
information necessary to the effective operation of the state or organization and the
security of its officials, personnel, and sources."' The Bagosora Trial Chamber
decided to construe the defense request for general access as a request to the
Rwandan government to locate and disclose the documents listed in the request.
Yet the previous problem, an overly broad categorical request, still prevented the
court from granting the motion in full."'
A failure to demonstrate the relevance of the requested information to the
trial is the second main reason for denial of orders of cooperation. When there is
some question of relevance the courts split the requirement into two elements. The
exact wording of the elements varies, but essentially the defense must show that the
requested information is (1) "relevant to any matter [at] issue before [the court]"
and (2) "necessary for a fair determination" of those questions.8 o
Although "[a] generalized claim of relevance is insufficient to justify the
issuance of an order under Article 28,""' this does not mean that the defense must
know the exact content of the requested materials. In response to a motion made by
counsel for Joseph Nzirorera, the Trial Chamber said, in connection with the
relevance of the requested information,

176 Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, Mugenzi, Bicamumpaka & Mugiraneza,
Case No. ICTR 99-50-T,
Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza's Motion Regarding Cooperation with the Republic of Burundi, 1 8
(Oct. 30, 2008).
17 Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Request to the Government of Rwanda for
Cooperation and Assistance Pursuant to Article 28 of the Statute, T 5 (March 10, 2004).
178 See Prosecutor v. Had2ihasanovid & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47, Decision on Defence Access
to EUMM Archives (Sept. 12, 2003).
"7 Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Request to the Government of Rwanda for
Cooperation and Assistance Pursuant to Article 28 of the Statute, 5 (March 10, 2004).
Iso Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-PT, Decision on Joseph Nzirorera's Motion for
a Request for Governmental Cooperation, T 8 (Apr. 19, 2005).
Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Decision on Ntabakuze Motion for
Information from the UNHCR and a Meeting with One of its Officials, T 8 (Oct. 6, 2006) (second
motion by Ntabakuze decided on Oct. 6, 2006).
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that even though [the defense] does not know [the] contents [of the
documents], the documents could be relevant to the assessment of the
credibility of the Prosecution witness in question, without making any
pronouncement as to the effects of the documents on the outcome of the
trial or on its admissibility as evidence.18 2
Providing a plausible connection to at least one issue and showing that the
information is necessary for a fair determination of the issue should be sufficient to
fulfill this requirement.
In at least fifteen decisions, trial chambers denied motions for orders of
cooperation on relevance grounds. In twelve of these, the trial chamber stated that
In the
the defense failed to show the relevancy of the requested information.'
other three, the chamber expressly deemed the requested information irrelevant.'"
A common trend in these decisions is that of defense attorneys requesting
information contained in documents, or known by persons, about events that are
physically or temporally distant from the events at issue in the trial. Various
decisions involved requests for interviews with high-level UN officials, a Belgian
professor, and a French military officer who were unlikely to have had specific
knowledge about the criminal responsibility of the defendants.' In the Ntabakuze
182 Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-PT, Decision on Joseph Nzirorera's Motion to
Request the Cooperation of the Government of a State, $ 5 (Feb. 23, 2005).
183 Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, Case No. ICTR 99-50-T, Decision on Casimir Bizumungu's
Requests for Disclosure of the Bruguiere Report and the Cooperation of France, $$ 25-27 (Sept. 25,
2006); Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Decision on Request for Cooperation of the
Government of France, T 6 (Oct. 6, 2006) (first motion by Ntabakuze decided on Oct. 6, 2006);
Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Decision on Ntabakuze Motion for Information from
the UNHCR and a Meeting with One of its Officials (Oct. 6, 2006) (second motion by Ntabakuze
decided on Oct. 6, 2006); Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Decision on Request for
Subpoenas of United Nations Officials, 8 (Oct. 6, 2006) (third motion by Ntabakuze decided on Oct.
6, 2006); Prosecutor v. Nzabonimana, Case No. ICTR 98-44D-PT, Decision on Callixte
Nzabonimana's Request for Subpoena to Professor Philip Verwimp and cooperation from the Kingdom
of Belgium, T 6 (Sept. 28, 2009); Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-T, Decision on
Defence Motion for Cooperation of Rwanda to Obtain Statement of Prosecution Witnesses ALG, GK
and UB, 13 (Mar. 22, 2007); Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-T, Decision on Defence
Motion for Exclusion of Witness GK's Testimony or for Request for cooperation from Government of
Rwanda, $ 14 (Nov. 27, 2006) (first motion by Nzirorera decided on Nov. 27, 2006); Prosecutor v.
Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-T, Decision on Defence Motion for Further Order to Obtain
Documents in Possession of Government of Rwanda, 1 15 (Nov. 27, 2006) (second motion by
Nzirorera decided on Nov. 27, 2006); Prosecutor v. Milutinovi6, Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Decision on
Application of Dragoljub Ojdanid for Binding Orders Pursuant to Rule 54bis, p. 5 (Mar. 23, 2005);
Prosecutor v. Milutinovid, Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Decision on Second Application of Dragoljub
Ojdanid for Binding Orders Pursuant to Rule 54bis, TT 28-30 (Nov. 17, 2005) (motion by Ojdanid);
Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Request to the Government of Rwanda for
Cooperation and Assistance Pursuant to Article 28 of the Statute, T 11 (March 10, 2004); Prosecutor v.
Hadlihasanovid & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47, Decision on Defence Access to EUMM Archives, p. 3
(Sept. 12, 2003).
1 Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Decision on the Bagosora Request for the
Government of France to Authorize the Appearance of a Witness, T 5 (Oct. 20, 2006); Prosecutor v.
Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-PT, Decision on Joseph Nzirorera's Motion for a Request for
Governmental Cooperation, T 9 (Apr. 19, 2005); Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-T,
Decision on Joseph Nzirorera's Motion for Binding Order to the United States of America and Motion
for Request for Cooperation to Government of Switzerland, 2 (Nov. 21, 2008).
1ss Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Decision on Request for Subpoenas of
United Nations Officials, 6 (Oct. 6, 2006) (third of three motions by Ntabakuze decided on Oct. 6,
2006); Prosecutor v. Nzabonimana, Case No. ICTR 98-44D-PT, Decision on Callixte Nzabonimana's
Request for Subpoena to Professor Philip Verwimp and cooperation from the Kingdom of Belgium,
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case at the ICTR, the trial chamber denied a defense motion requesting a meeting
with an official at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
The defense wanted to interview him with an eye towards having him testify about
his knowledge of massacres in Rwanda. The defense claimed his testimony might
help its trial argument that the massacres were a result of the RPF war strategy and
as a result the defendant's liability should be diminished. The Trial Chamber
denied the request, saying that the UNHCR official was not present in Rwanda
before August 1994 and only had knowledge about refugees and their treatment as
they returned to their homes post-conflict. The trial chamber found that his
knowledge of events in Rwanda was unlikely to relate in any direct manner to
Ntabakuze's criminal responsibility.'
Another version of this problem occurs when defense attorneys request
materials about events that are not only physically or temporally distant from the
events at issue in the trial, but are also extremely controversial. In two cases at the

ICTR, the defense requested a controversial report, known as the "Bruguiere
report," which allegedly blamed the assassination of the Rwandan president on the
Rwandan Patriotic Front. The defense attorneys requested the report to bolster their
argument that the assassination pushed the situation in Rwanda out of control and
thus mitigated the defendants' responsibility. The Trial Chambers denied the
motions saying that details regarding the exact individuals responsible for shooting
down the former president's plane were not necessary to make such an argument.'"
The third and final requirement to obtain an order of cooperation is that the
requesting party must show the court it has independently attempted to secure the
state's voluntary cooperation,"' and that its efforts were unsuccessful.' 9 The
requesting party must take "reasonable steps" to acquire the materials from the state
or international organization, 9 but is not required to exhaust every available option
before motioning the court for an order. 9 ' A party may not escape this requirement
by requesting the materials from the prosecution, even if the prosecution has
possession of the materials. Except for exculpatory information in the actual

5-6 (Sept. 28, 2009); Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Decision on the Bagosora
Request for the Government of France to Authorize the Appearance of a Witness, T4 (Oct. 20, 2006).
1 Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Decision on Ntabakuze Motion for
Information from the UNHCR and a Meeting with One of Its Officials, 1 8 (Oct. 6, 2006) (second
motion by Ntabakuze).
181 Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, Case No. ICTR 99-50-T, Decision on Casimir Bizumungu's
Requests for Disclosure of the Bruguiere Report and the Cooperation of France, TI 25-27 (Sept. 25,
2006); Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Decision on Request for Cooperation of the
Government of France, 114, 6 (Oct. 6, 2006).
18s Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44, Decision on Motions for Order for Production
of Documents by the Government of Rwanda and for Consequential Orders, 7 (Feb. 13, 2006);
Prosecutor v. Milutinovid, Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Decision on Second Application of Dragoljub
Ojdanik for Binding Orders Pursuant to Rule 54bis (Nov. 17, 2005); Prosecutor v. Hadfihasanovid &
Kubura, Case No. IT-0 1-47, Decision on Defence Motion for Access to EUMM Archives, 6 (Dec. 15,
2003).
Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, Case No. ICTR 99-50-T, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza's Motion
Regarding Cooperation with the Republic of Burundi, 1 14 (Oct. 30, 2008) (motion by Mugiraneza).
" ICTY RPE, R. 54bis(B)(ii) (1995) (adopted Nov. 17, 1999).
191Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Appellant's Motion for the Extension for
the Time-limit and Admission of Additional Evidence, 47 (Oct. 15, 1998); Prosecutor v. Bizimungu,
Case No. ICTR 99-50-T, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza's Motion Regarding Cooperation with the
Republic of Burundi, T 14 (Oct. 30, 2008) (motion by Mugiraneza).
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possession of the prosecution,' the defense has the responsibility to obtain all the
information it wishes to use in its case. 9' ICC judges have already demonstrated
that they will strictly interpret and enforce the prosecutorial obligation to disclose
exculpatory evidence,'94 and it logically follows that the defense teams will be
expected to demonstrate due diligence and professionalism in their quest for
admissible and relevant evidence. An important exception to this trend is that the
defense will still be considered to have made sufficient prior efforts despite refusing
to accept a prior offer of information from a state if the state requires that the
materials be accepted pursuant to a conditional offer of confidentiality.' 9
2. Analysis of Current Trends

There are two reasons for enforcing the prior efforts requirement, in
addition to the reasons, such as state security, previously discussed. The Karadiid
Trial Chamber has stated a preference for information requests to be dealt with on a
voluntary basis because of the potential for lengthy rule 54bis litigation. In the
Milogevi6 case, for example, the Prosecution commenced rule 54bis litigation with
the (then) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 2002, which had not been resolved by
the time the case came to an end in 2006.96 The second reason, stated by the trial
chamber in the Simba case, is that because of the seriousness of the tribunal's
authority to issue orders to states, which arises from Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter, orders for cooperation should not be issued lightly. Enforcing a prior
efforts requirement ensures this authority is used sparingly, and in fact logically
flows from the overarching defense duty to exercise due diligence in the
investigation and preparation of the defense case.
Nine of the surveyed decisions were denied (in full or in part) because the

192 See Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 54(1) (obligating the prosecutor to "investigate
incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally"). In the ICC, the prosecution must turn over
such exculpatory materials "as soon as practicable" and the Pre-Trial Chambers have concluded that
this is a continuing obligation that begins prior to the confirmation of charges. Prosecutor v. Lubanga,
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-102, Decision on the Final System of Disclosure and the Establishment of a
Timetable, 1 125-29 (May 15, 2006); Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-60, Decision
Modifying the Calendar for the Disclosure of the Supporting Materials of the Prosecution Application
for a Warrant of Arrest Against Germain Katanga, %f8-9 (Nov. 5, 2007). The ICC has enforced the
prosecution's disclosure duties quite strictly. It was prepared to terminate its first case and release a
defendant from custody as a remedy for disclosure violations by the prosecution.
193Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR 01-76-T, Decision on Matters Related to Witness KDD's
Judicial Dossier, $ 9 (Nov. 1, 2004) ("Furthermore, the Defence is not relieved of its obligation
because the Prosecution has not yet been successful. In view of the threshold requirement under Article
28 the Chamber cannot, based on the information presently provided by the Defence, issue an order
under that provision.").
194Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Release of Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo, 1 (July 2, 2008).
1
Prosecutor v. Milutinovid, Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Decision on Second Application of
Dragoljub Ojdani6 for Binding Orders Pursuant to Rule 54bis, 24 (Nov. 17, 2005).
96 Prosecutor v. Karad~ii,
Case No. IT-95-5/18-I, Decision on the Accused's Application for
Binding Order Pursuant to Rule 54bis (United States of America), T 12 n. 21 (Oct. 12, 2009).
Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR 0l-76-T, Decision on Matters Related to Witness KDD's
Judicial Dossier, $ 9 (Nov. 1, 2004); see also Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-PT, Judgement
on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July
1997, $ 31 (Oct. 29, 1997).
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defense failed to show sufficient prior efforts.'" Another three were denied because
the defense made prior efforts, but failed to show that the efforts were in fact
unsuccessful.'99 Among the twelve decisions, various problems appear in the
defense motions.
A decision from the Ojdanid case at the ICTY and a decision from the
Bagosora case at the ICTR involve requests for large amounts of materials. It
appears either that the defense lost track of which requests had been previously
submitted to particular states and which had not, or that the defense intentionally
inserted a few small requests which had not previously been sent to the relevant
states into a larger group of requests that had previously been sent.2 00 Assuming the
innocence of the defense teams, they should keep better track of the requests that
have been submitted to states and those that have not. If the inclusion of the
requests was intentional, then it is advisable for the defense to avoid this tactic.
There is, however, no empirical basis for assuming that defense teams use this
tactic successfully in many motions but happened to get caught in these situations.
The next problem is a lack of specificity, not in the sense of specifically
identifying documents but in the sense of dividing up multiple requests that appear
to be one. In Bagosora, the defense made a motion for an order of cooperation to
obtain an interview with a Belgian military officer and custody of his personal
notes. The court granted the motion for the interview, but denied it for the personal
notes of the officer because the original defense request to Belgium only requested
an interview and failed to mention the production of documents.1

19 Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Request to the Government of Rwanda for
Cooperation and Assistance Pursuant to Article 28 of the Statute (Mar. 10, 2004) (motion by all four
defendants; listed as motion by Bagosora in appendices and attachments); Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case
No. ICTR 98-41-T, Decision on Request to the Kingdom of the Netherlands for Cooperation and
Assistance, T 9 (Feb. 7, 2005); Prosecutor v. Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 97-27-1, Decision on the Defense
Motion to Have the Court Request a Subpoena Duces Tecum for the Production of the Defendant's
Arrest and Certified Court Records, p. 4 (May 10, 2000); Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR 9844-T, Decision on the Ex Parte Defence Motion for Order to United Nations Department of PeaceKeepig [sic] Operations for Production of Documents, 22 (Mar. 9, 2004); Prosecutor v. Karemera,
Case No. ICTR 98-44-T, Decision on Defence Motion for Exclusion of Witness GK's Testimony or for
Request for Cooperation from Government of Rwanda, 1 10 (Nov. 27, 2006) (first of three motions by
Nzirorera decided on Nov. 27, 2006); Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-T, Decision on
Defence Motion for Further Order to Obtain Documents in Possession of Government of Rwanda, 14
(Nov. 27, 2006) (second of three motions by Nzirorera decided on Nov. 27, 2006); Prosecutor v.
Milutinovid, Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Decision on Second Application of Dragoljub Ojdani6 for Binding
Orders Pursuant to Rule 54bis, 28-30 (Nov. 17, 2005); Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR 01-76T, Decision on the Defence Request for the Cooperation of Rwandan Government Pursuant to Article
28, T 5 (Oct. 28, 2004); Prosecutor v. Brdadin & Talid, Case No. IT-99-36/1, Public Version of the
Confidential Decision on The Alleged Illegality of Rule 70 of 6 May 2001, T 1 (May 23, 2002).
9 Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR 98-41 -T, Decision on Request for Assistance Pursuant
to Article 28 of the Statute (May 27, 2005); Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-T, Decision
on Defence Extremely Urgent Motion for Extension of Time and for an Order of Cooperation of the
Government of Rwanda (Dec. 13, 2001); Prosecutor v. Karad2id, Case No. IT-95-5/18-I, Decision on
the Accused's Application for Binding Order Pursuant to Rule 54bis (United States of America), 1 12
n.21 (Oct. 12, 2009).
200 Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Request to the Government of Rwanda for
Cooperation and Assistance Pursuant to Article 28 of the Statute (Mar. 10, 2004) (motion by all four
defendants; listed as motion by Bagosora in appendices and attachments); Prosecutor v. Milutinovid,
Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Decision on Second Application of Dragoljub Ojdanid for Binding Orders
Pursuant to Rule 54bis, 127 (Nov. 17, 2005) .
201Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR 98-41 -T, Decision on Request to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands for Cooperation and Assistance, T 9 (Feb. 7, 2005).
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A similar problem-the defense failing to give sufficient support to its
assertions of prior efforts-occurred in the Nzirorera case where the defense
motioned for an order for the production of documents by the U.N. Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, stating that it had sent two letters requesting the
documents. The trial chamber denied the request on prior efforts grounds because
the defense had failed to give any details regarding the letters, such as when or how
they were sent, and did not say whether any response had been received.202
Defense attorneys also make obviously premature motions on occasion. In
the Ntabakuze case, the defense motioned the court before the requested state had
responded to the request for information. 203 Likewise, defense counsel for Semanza
motioned the court for an order of cooperation before it was evident that any
problems would arise. The defense asked the court to ensure that there would be no
"diplomatic bottlenecks" in connection with a proposed defense visit to Rwanda to
interview expert witnesses. The Semanza Trial Chamber flatly denied the request
204
because Rwanda had not demonstrated an unwillingness to cooperate in any way.
In the Karadidcase, the defense motioned the court for an order of cooperation to
the United States even while its motion seeking approval of a Rule 70
confidentiality agreement related to the same request was pending before the
tribunal.205
The last problem with defense motions, which is manifest in two decisions
in the Nzirorera case, is when the defense motions the court without making prior
efforts, even after it clearly had a previous opportunity to obtain the documents. In
one decision, the Nzirorera trial chamber said: "the Defence does not explain why it
has not met with other witnesses at the appropriate time, nor does it claim that the
witnesses refused to be interviewed.. . . Again, the Defence does not explain why
it did not meet the witness earlier in order to obtain the requested documents which
appear to be in the witness' possession, in a timely fashion."206
This sampling of cases is representative of the rich diversity of motions
practice and the extensive efforts made by the defense to obtain relevant
information from a variety of sources and agencies. While some defense efforts
were flawed, on the whole the battles over access to evidence demonstrate the
maturity and tenacity of defense teams more than any other dimension of current
practice.
202 Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-T, Decision on the Ex Parte
Defence Motion
for Order to United Nations Department of Peace-Keepig [sic] Operations for Production of
Documents, T 22 (Mar. 9, 2004).
203 Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Decision on Request for Assistance Pursuant
to Article 28 of the Statute, 1 2 (May 27, 2005). However, note that it is unknown what amount of time
passed between the submission of the defense request to France and the filing of the motion with the
court. See id
204 Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-T, Decision on Defence Extremely Urgent
Motion for Extension of Time and for an Order of Cooperation of the Government of Rwanda, 1 9
(Dec. 13, 2001).
205 Prosecutor v. Karadfi,
Case No. IT-95-5/18-I, Decision on the Accused's Application for
Binding Order Pursuant to Rule 54bis (United States of America), T 12 n.21 (Oct. 12, 2009).
206 Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-T, Decision on Defence Motion for Further
Order to Obtain Documents in Possession of Government of Rwanda, T 14 (Nov. 27, 2006) (second of
three Nov. 27, 2006 decisions); see also Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-T, Decision on
Defence Motion for Exclusion of Witness GK's Testimony or for Request for cooperation from
Government of Rwanda (Nov. 27, 2006) (motion by Nzirorera (first of three Nov. 27, 2006 decisions)).
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B. Reforming the Right to Representation
Despite lingering popular mistrust of defense counsel who are vigilant in

advocating for the rights of those accused of the world's worst atrocities, available
evidence indicates that modem defense counsel are an indispensable element of
efficient proceedings. The rigorous vetting standards and the increasing degree of
specialized knowledge required for defense counsel today make them highly
engaged and effective on behalf of their clients. In fact, the disruptive behavior of
defendants in the absence of representation by counsel highlights the crucial ability
of defense attorneys to facilitate fair and efficient proceedings. Furthermore, the
predominant strategy of judges to appoint standby counsel in the event of such
disruptive behavior demonstrates the faith that judges place in defense counsel to
alleviate difficulties presented by uncooperative defendants.
As recently illustrated in the KaradiiD6 and Taylor cases in the ICTY and
SCSL respectively, tribunals continue to face situations where defendants refuse to
Boycotts can bring proceedings to a
make mandatory court appearances.20'
standstill, leaving judges to make difficult decisions on whether to stay the
proceedings or continue in the absence of the accused. Perhaps more importantly,
boycotts undermine the perception of a fair and orderly administration of justice,
which in fact may often be the defendant's goal. Judge Wald points out correctly
that most disruptive behavior originates with the defendants themselves and not
their counsel.208 Refusal to attend open court represents a defendant's attempt to
delegitimize proceedings rather than engage with the bench in a good faith effort to
achieve justice. Despite the multiplicity of forums, no tribunal should permit
counsel to engage in a deliberate pattern of conduct to disrupt or otherwise
interfere with the dignity, order, and decorum of the proceedings. In the modem
era, universalized substantive norms and the uniformity of ethical expectations
incumbent on the defense hinders any effort to forum shop for a tribunal that will
protect such disruptive conduct from ethical sanctions.
It goes without saying that no responsible defense attorney can ethically
pursue that goal. In making the decision whether to proceed in the absence of
counsel or without the defendant in open court, tribunals must balance important
values and concerns-namely the defendant's right to a fair trial and the court's
interest in seeking justice in a timely manner. Furthermore, the prospect of
boycotting counsel or defendants represents perhaps the most pointed test for the
utility and professional preparation of the Defense Office and the private bar
organizations seeking to aid defense attorneys.
As discussed below, defendants' justifications for boycotting often
implicate core trial equity concerns-specifically that the accused has not had the
necessary time and resources to adequately prepare for trial. Motivated by concerns
207 See, e.g., Ian Traynor, Radovan Karadii6 Boycotts Opening of War Crimes Trial, GUARDIAN,
Oct. 26, 2009, htp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/26/radovan-karadzic-war-crimes-trial
("Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader charged with genocide for the worst mass murders in
Europe since the Nazis, called the bluff of the special UN war crimes tribunal today by boycotting the

opening of his trial."); Alexandra Hudson, Liberia's Taylor Boycotts War Crime Trial, REUTERS, Jun.

("Former Liberian
4, 2007, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/06/04/idUSLO44608._CH_.2400
President Charles Taylor boycotted the start of his war crimes trial on Monday, saying he would not get
a fair hearing at the U.N.-backed court where he is accused of atrocities in Sierra Leone.").
208 PATRICIA WALD, TYRANTS ON TRIAL: KEEPING ORDER IN THE COURTROOM 28 (2009).
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that limiting the defendant's ability to shape defense strategy could warrant
questions of fairness, tribunals have generally been amenable to providing some
leeway, such as postponing proceedings to allow the accused additional preparation
time. Yet, as the tribunals' jurisprudence in this area continues to develop, it is
becoming clear that the ad hoc courts are becoming less tolerant in accepting
defendants' attempts to prolong trials by not showing up to court. Rather, current
jurisprudence applies a range of options such as appointing amicus curiae or
standby legal representation to counterbalance boycotts and ensure minimal trial
disruption.
Boycotting defendants proffer several reasons for why they choose not to
attend mandatory court appearances. They include (a) challenges to the legality of
their indictment and arrest;2" (b) doubts of the tribunals' integrity and ability to
provide a fair trial;210 (c) claims of health concerns, either being physically or
mentally unfit to attend proceedings; 211 (d) dissatisfaction with the work of their
counsel; 212 or (e) beliefs that they or their attorneys have not had adequate time
and/or resources to review and prepare their case.21
For example, at the start of his trial in 2000 in the ICTR, Jean-Bosco
Barayagwiza informed the trial chamber via his counsel that he would not attend
court proceedings because he doubted the ICTR's ability to give him a "just and
fair" trial.2 14 Not once during the proceedings did he personally appear in court. In
2007, former Liberian president Charles Taylor sent his court-appointed attorney to
the SCSL trial chamber with a letter stating that he would not attend proceedings
because he believed he could not receive a fair trial nor had he been given
"adequate time and facilities" to prepare his defense.2"s Taylor also fired his
See, e.g., Charles Taylor, who claimed he had immunity from indictment and trial under the
Head of State doctrine in his capacity as former President of Liberia, Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No.
SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction (May 31, 2004). On the first day of his trial
in an Iraqi domestic court organized to incorporate international precedents, Saddam Hussein famously
demanded of the presiding judge: "Who are you? What does this court want?" Saddam Hussein alTikriti, deposed President of Iraq added: "I don't answer this so-called court, with all due respect, and I
reserve my constitutional rights as the president of the country of Iraq. I don't acknowledge either the
entity that authorizes you, nor the aggression, because everything based on a falsehood is a falsehood."
209

ENEMY OF THE STATE, supra note 8, at 3.
210 Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR 97-19-T, Decision on Defense Counsel to

Withdraw,
I & 5 (Nov. 2, 2000).
211 Jovica Stanii's trial was postponed after a doctor submitted a report to the
tribunal stating
findings that Staniti6 was not mentally fit to stand trial, and would not be for at least three months. The
trial eventually was held in the absence of Stanigid in court. See Prosecutor v. Stanigid & Simatovid,
Reasons for Decision Denying the Stanigi6 Defence Request to Postpone the Court Proceedings and
Decision Proceeding with the Court Session of 29 June 2009 in the Absence of the Accused (Jul. 22,
2009).
212 For example, in 2001, Hassan Ngeze, on trial in the ICTR, said he would boycott proceedings
because the tribunal refused to replace his counsel, whom it considered "traitors." Prosecutor v. Ngeze,
Case No. ICTR 97-27-1, Decision on the Accused's Request for Withdrawal of His Counsel (Mar. 29,
2001).
213 See, e.g., Transcript of Record, Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T, Prosecution
Opening Statement -10:30 a.m. (Jun. 4, 2007) [hereinafter Taylor Transcript].
214 Barayagwiza, supra note
210.
215 Through his counsel, Taylor stated to the tribunal: "I am driven to the conclusion that I will
not
receive a fair trial before the Special Court .... I must decline to attend any further hearings in this
case until adequate time and facilities are provided to my Defence team and until my other longstanding reasonable complaints are dealt with. It follows that I must terminate instructions to my legal
representatives in this matter. Despite my complete confidence in their ability and competence, I must
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attorney and elected for self-representation. More recently, in October 2009,
Radovan Karadi refused to make an appearance in the ICTY, claiming that he
was not properly prepared to start.2 6 Proceedings for Karadii6, who is representing
himself, did not resume until March 2010.
A common thread weaves throughout the cases and tribunals with regard to
the use of boycotts and other extremely disruptive behaviors-almost all incidents
involve defendants who have fired their counsel and chosen self-representation.217
In doing so, the accused have dispensed with the expertise and sophistication
needed to maneuver the trial process efficiently and effectively. Judges have been
criticized for yielding to the spectacle of a boycotting defendant, some critics
suggesting that the jurists are allowing (alleged) war criminals to set court agenda
and manipulate the judicial process. Whether the defendants' reasons for refusing
to show up are legitimate or veiled attempts to disrupt and hinder judicial
proceedings, the accused has a clear right to hear the allegations against him in
court.2 8 At the same time, various Chambers have concluded that the right can also
be waived. The waiver of a defendant's right to self-representation, along with the
developed limits to that right, balances against the necessity for achieving optimal
fairness to animate the searching debate over the best mechanisms for dealing with
boycotts.
The typology of developed judicial responses to boycotts has included (1)
forcing the defendant to attend;219 (2) postponing the proceedings; 2 0 (3) conducting
ask that they cease to represent me before the Special Court and instruct them accordingly." Taylor
Transcript, supra note 213.
216 See Transcript of Record, Prosecutor v. Karad2id, Case No. IT-95-5/18-I (Oct. 26, 2009) ("Mr.
Karad2id filed a submission, stating that he would not appear for today's hearing on the basis that he's
not fully prepared for the commencement of trial.").
217 See e.g, Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No. IT-02-54, Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67,
Prosecutor v. Krasjnik, Case No. IT-00-39, and Prosecutor v. Karadi, Case No. It-95-5/18-I; in the
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR 97-19-T; and in the SCSL, Prosecutor v. Taylor,
Case No. SCSL-03-01. For a general overview of self-representation, see Nina Jorgensen, The Right of
the Accused to Self-Representation Before International Criminal Tribunals, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 711

(Oct. 2004).
2s See e.g., ICTY Statute, supra note 41, art. 21(4)(d) ("[T]he accused shall be entitled ... to be
tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own
choosing ... .); ICTR Statute, supra note 41, art. 20(4)(d) ("[T]he accused shall be entitled ... [t]o be
tried in his or her presence, and to defend himself or herself in person or through legal assistance of his
or her own choosing.").
219 The tribunals, for obvious reasons, have been reluctant to forcibly haul unwilling defendants
into court. Such action could damage the integrity and legitimacy of the court and the trial itself. A
survey of the various tribunals' rulings suggests that the option has really never been considered to be
viable, even when the prosecution specifically requested compulsory attendance of defendants. ENEMY
OF THE STATE, supra note 8, at 130-31.
220 In most cases of boycotts, self-representing defendants claim unpreparedness and request

additional time to ready their cases. After his boycott, Karad2id received an additional four months to
assemble his case. On November 5, 2009, the court granted a stay until March and appointed Karad2id
counsel. Decision on Appointment of Counsel and Order on Further Trial Proceedings, TIT25-26 (Nov.
5, 2009). The tribunals recognize that without skilled attorneys, defendant-lawyers may require
additional time, but caution that this is a tradeoff when voluntarily choosing to dispense with legal
representation. See Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Decision on the Interlocutory Appeal by the Amici Curiae
Against the Trial Chamber Order Concerning the Presentation of the Defence Case, T 19 (Jan. 20,
2004).
(There is no doubt that, by choosing to conduct his own defence, the Accused deprived himself of
resources a well-equipped legal defence team could have provided. A defendant who decides to
represent himself relinquishes many of the benefits associated with representation by counsel. The
legal system's respect for a defendant's decision to forgo assistance of counsel must be reciprocated by
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a trial in absentia; 221 (4) suspending the right to self-representation; 222 (5) imposing
counsel on the defendant; 223 (6) appointment of counsel amicus curiae; and (7)
appointment of standby counsel. There has been a noticeable trend over time for
judges to shift from the previous practice of deferring proceedings in favor of
defendants who refuse to show up in court, to considering the implementation of
contingency measures such as "shadow" counsel (standby and amicus curiae).
Such shadow counsel serve to minimize disruption to court proceedings, but also
represent a tangible signal of the confidence that the Chambers place in the
professionalism and preparation of the defense bar.
The Chamber's decision to appoint counsel amici curiae was an innovative
step taken in the Miloievid case in response to the defendant's self-representation.
Amici counsel helped the tribunal to seek the proper disposition of the case in
accordance with established jurisprudence and standards of justice; in hindsight,
judges and amici worked together to help demonstrate to a skeptical public that the
defendant received a fair trial based on available law and evidence rather than raw
political pressure.224 Unlike counsel that are imposed or on standby, amicus curiae
the acceptance of responsibility for the disadvantages this choice may bring.)
Additionally, the tribunals remain cognizant that a defendant's claims (and boycotts) are often tactics
used to manipulate and prolong proceedings, a lesson learned in the Milotevi6 trial in the ICTY. See
Prosecutor v. Miloievid, Order Terminating the Proceedings (Mar. 14, 2006).
221 Both the ICTR and SCSL adopted rules in 2003 that allow the respective courts to hold
proceedings in the absence of the defendant. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rule 82bis (amended Mar. 14, 2008) [hereinafter ICTR Rules] and
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, No. 60 (amended May 27,
2008). While the ICTY has not adopted a similar rule, in the Simid case the Trial Chamber continued
with trial proceedings, even though Simid was not physically present in the courtroom. See Prosecutor
v. Simid, Case No. IT-95-9/2-S, Sentencing Judgement, 8 (Oct. 17, 2002).
222 See Prosecutor v. Milogevi6, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of
the Trial Chamber's Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, 1 12 (Nov. 1, 2004) ("While this
right to self-representation is indisputable, jurisdictions around the world recognize that it is not
categorically inviolable."). See also Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-T, Decision on
the Application of Samuel Hinga Norman for Self Representation under Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute
of the Special Court 1 9 (Jun. 8, 2004) ("the right to self representation by an accused person is a
qualified and not an absolute right"); Prosecutor v. Setelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT; Prosecutor v. Se~elj,
Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution's Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to Assist
Vojislav elelj with his Defence, T 21 (May 9, 2003) ("The complex legal, evidential and procedural
issues that arise in a case of this magnitude may fall outside the competence even of a legally qualified
accused, especially where that accused is in detention without access to all the facilities he may need.
Moreover, the Tribunal has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the trial proceeds in a timely manner
without interruptions, adjournments or disruptions."); Prosecutor v. Karad2id, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T,
Decision on Appointment of Counsel and Order on Further Trial Proceedings, 1 27 (Nov. 5, 2009)
("[If| the Accused continue[s] to absent himself from the resumed trial proceedings in March, or should
he engage in any other conduct that obstructs the proper and expeditious conduct of the trial, he will
forfeit his right to self-representation.").
223 For example, the ICTY Statute provides that the accused can "have legal assistance assigned to
him, in any case where the interests ofjustice so require." ICTY Statute, supra note 41, art. 21(4)(d).
224 Amicus Curiae counsel would be responsible for assisting the chamber by:
(a) making any submissions properly open to the accused by way of preliminary or other pre-trial
motion; (b) making any submissions or objections to evidence properly open to the accused during
the trial proceedings and cross-examining witnesses as appropriate; (c) drawing to the attention of
the Trial Chamber any exculpatory or mitigating evidence; and (d) acting in any other way which
designated counsel considers appropriate in order to secure a fair trial.
Prosecutor v. Milogevi6, Case No. IT-02-54, Order Inviting Designation of Amicus Curiae (Aug. 30,
2001). In 2002 and 2003, the Tribunal expanded the role of Amici Curiae to bring potential defenses
before the court and monitor the health of Milogevid. Prosecutor v. Miloievid, Case No. IT-02-54,
Order Concerning Amici Curiae (Jan. 11, 2002) and Prosecutor v. Milotevid, Case No. IT-02-54, Order
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counsel do not actually represent the defendant but instead serve as a failsafe
mechanism for both the court and the accused. In principle, this duality prevents
foreseeable conflicts of interest, though some judges would prefer to impose
counsel directly or opt for standby counsel to avoid the appearance of ethical
conflicts and competing loyalties altogether.225 The primary function of an amicus
counsel is to help ensure the overall effectiveness of the proceedings and remedy, in
a sense, the potential problems that could occur when a defendant represents
himself. In Milogevi6, the amici attorneys had access to all information and
materials that Milogevid had, and were responsible for bringing all evidence in
favor of the defendant to the court's attention.
Similar to the amici curiae, standby attorneys are a failsafe mechanism for
the courts. Standby counsel generally play a more passive role in proceedings,
serving as observers to the process until they may be pressed into service by judicial
order. However, at either the request of the Accused or the Trial Chamber, the
standby counsel may step in to handle a specific part of the case.226 In the most
egregious of circumstances, standby counsel may be required to assume the case in
its entirety from the defendant or from retained counsel who withdraw or
themselves boycott proceedings.227 Judge Gunawardana noted in Barayagwiza that
a significant advantage of standby counsel is that they usually have some level of
involvement in the case before assuming complete control over it. 228 When
attorneys are imposed and come to the case later, they could have only a few
months to review a torrent of case files and documents to prepare for trial. The
recently issued Practice Direction by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon takes this
truism to its logical extension by permitting the Head of Defence Office to
of Further Instruction to the Amici Curiae (Oct. 6, 2003). See also Prosecutor v. Milotevid, Case No.
IT-02-54, Order Concerning the Provision of Documents to Amici Curiae (Sept. 19, 2001) (providing
that amici curiae should have access to all materials, included confidential materials, that are provided
to the accused).
225 See Prosecutor v Krajignik, Case No IT-00-39-A, Decision on Mom6ilo Krajiinik's Request to
Self-Represent, on Counsel's Motions in Relation to the Appointment of Amicus Curiae, and on the
Prosecution Motion of 16 February 2007, Tf 80-81 (May 11, 2007) (separate opinion of Judge
Schomburg) (arguing that the position of amicus curiae will create conflicts of interest for counsel and
that it is better to impose counsel on the accused instead).
226 See Prosecutor v. eielj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Order Concerning Appointment of Standby
Counsel and Delayed Commencement of Trial, 6 (Oct. 25, 2006) (providing list of responsibilities of
standby counsel) and Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-T, Order for Assignment of
Standby Counsel for Samuel Hinga Norman (Jun. 15, 2004) (Norman assented to having standby
counsel appointed after he fired his defense team and elected for self-representation). During the AlDujial trial, at one point the retained counsel and lead defendants stormed out of the courtroom,
prompting one of the lesser defendants to plead with the bench "We are subject to the court, we respect
the court, but we need our lawyers." The presiding judge pointed to the standby counsel in the
courtroom and replied, "The court [appointed] lawyers will defend you and your rights." ENEMY OF
THE STATE, supra note 8, at 130.
227 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Karadfid, IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on the Appointment of Counsel and
Order on Further Proceedings, T 27 (Nov. 5, 2009) (noting that if Karadi's conduct "obstructs the
proper and expeditious conduct of the trial," he will no longer be entitled to self-representation or help
from his legal associates, and the "appointed counsel will take over as an assigned counsel.").
228 Judge Gunawardana noted,
It is to be observed that it is an advantage in the present case to require Ms Marchessault and/or Mr
Danielson to be appointed as standby counsel, as they are already fully conversant with the facts of
the case and, as is evident from the communication by the accused to the Court, enjoy the
confidence of Mr Barayagwiza. Thus, such an appointment would avoid any delay that the
appointment of new counsel may ensue.
Barayagwiza, supra note 210 (Gunawardana concurring).
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intervene orally or in writing to the bench on a propio motu basis if warranted by
"the interests of justice."229
The Karadii6, Taylor, and Al-Dujail trials all indicate that practice is

shifting towards standby counsel as a viable solution to boycotts. Standby counsel
best balance the need for efficiency and decorum with the defendant's inherent
rights in judicial proceedings. The tribunals' most effective solution to boycotts
lies in mitigating the effects of the disruptions to trial proceedings rather than
attempting to tackle the underlying root causes that defendants say are the reasons
for refusing to come to court. Boycotts are a method of expressing dissatisfaction,
and if obdurate defendants have a disagreement with the court or want to hamper
proceedings, boycotts may be inevitable. Instead of accepting such an outcome,
with its attendant perceptual difficulties and the very real due process concerns,
defendants should be dissuaded from engaging in the disruptive conduct. This
outcome is best achieved by undermining the perceived benefits gained from
boycotts, though of course there are a range of other conceivable manifestations of
defendant displeasure.230
The trend towards appointment of standby counsel provides the ideal
solution to minimizing boycotts' deleterious effect. By having counsel available to
immediately step in once a defendant's conduct becomes untenable tribunals have a
fallback that minimizes disruption to court proceedings. Secondly, unlike attorneys
imposed on defendants post hoc, standby counsel ideally will have monitored the
proceedings from the very beginning and therefore will be more effective from the
very outset of their representation. Imposed counsel will generally have insufficient
time to review voluminous court documents and testimony to prepare for trial,
which likewise results in a significant postponement of proceedings. The option of
imposing counsel after the initiation of proceedings therefore carries the incumbent
risk for further trial delays and inefficiencies. Third, standby counsel will not have
a direct role in the defendant's case, unlike amicus curiae. As long as the defendant
cooperates, he or she still has control over how the case is shaped without any
outside interference. Given the development of professional organizations and
Defense Offices that can serve as portals to assist with training and expedited trial
preparation, and the concomitant creation of consistent ethical Codes, standby
counsel can be rapidly integrated into the tempo of an ongoing trial. In addition,
however, the Head of Defence Office should serve as a necessary augmentation to
the efforts of standby counsel or amici when the interests of justice require. The
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Practice Direction on the Role of the Head of Office in
2011),
http://www.stl7
(Mar.
30,
Tribunal,
§2,
Before
the
Proceedings
229

tsl.org/x/file/TheRegistry/Library/BackgroundDocuments/RulesRegulations/practice-directions/STLPD-2011-04 Role of Head-of DefenceOfficeWEBEN.PDF.
230 The range of defendant misconduct takes at least five other potential variations: (1) "passive
disrespect" (examples include Milogevid referring to the judge as Mister, or Barzan al-Tikirit wearing
his pajamas to court and sitting with his back to the bench-judges will typically ignore these
manifestations); (2) "refusal to cooperate" (i.e., failure to submit to court orders or to comply with
procedural requirements); (3) the "single obscenity or shout" (providing the judge an opportunity to
quickly reestablish control and to revisit the pre-established ground rules for court decorum); (4)
"repeated interruption of the judge, prosecutor, or witnesses" (judges may choose to shut down the
defendant's microphone or to isolate him in a glass enclosure or impose a requirement that
communications with the court be in written form: egregious examples may result in removal from
court or even contempt rulings as in the elej case); (5) physical violence (warranting handcuffs,
immediate contempt citations, or removal). NORMAN DORSEN AND LEON FRIEDMAN, DISORDER IN
THE COURT: REPORT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 111-18 (1973).

434

STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

47:379

overarching framework of substantive law and evidentiary sophistication that is
shared across continents and jurisdictions today also provides a pool of capable
counsel that can become engaged in any particular case in very short order. An
organized and mature defense bar is the necessary predicate for this salutary
development.
C. The Dearth of Conclusive Contempt Findings

1. In General
This article will conclude by dispensing with a widespread but
demonstrably misplaced caution regarding the role of a mature international defense
bar. Concerns about contempt of court strike at the very heart of the judicial
process, yet the available evidence does not warrant the presumption that an
aggressive and engaged defense bar will automatically result in disruptive and
combative proceedings that warrant contempt findings. Conduct not in accord with
the tribunals' rules and procedures"' can lengthen proceedings, hamper a party's
case, and obstruct the court's effective administration of justice.23 A survey of
contempt-related rulings in the tribunals-specifically the ICTR and ICTYreveals that the vast majority of contempt-related proceedings involve improprieties
related to witnesses. To be clear, the data set for this sub-part included all available
contempt proceedings from the ICTY and ICTR. Specifically, parties file motions
for contempt for three main reasons: (1) a party (or agent of the party) has violated
court protective orders in regards to witnesses, usually by releasing identifying
information; (2) a party has engaged in witness intimidation; or (3) a witness has
refused to appear or answer questions before the court.233 Interestingly, almost
every contempt allegation predated the reforms of the 2002-03 timeframe, and
almost always involved larger trials with groups of defense lawyers that were
comparatively more active in filing motions.
Surprisingly few of the decisions reviewed resulted in counsel to the
proceedings being held in contempt. In Karemera, the defense argued, "sanctions
have been imposed against Defense Counsel in all major trials held at the Tribunal,
while the Prosecutor has never been more than warned." Defense counsel alleged
that an uneven "application of the Rule ... discourage[s] the Defence from bringing
motions, and ... affect[s] the right to a fair trial."234 Setting aside the potential
For a complete list of conduct punishable as contempt of court, see ICTY RPE, supra note
112,
R. 77, Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 70, and ICC RPE supra note 51, R. 162-72.
232 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR 96-14-R, Decision on Third
Request for
Review, 10 (Jan. 23, 2008) ("[The] Appeals Chamber stresses that protective measures pursuant to
Rule 75 of the rules are ordered to safeguard the privacy and security of victims of witnesses.
Revealing closed session material without prior authorization vitiates the protective measures and
consequently constitutes a grave interference with the Tribunal's administration of justice.").
233 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kabashi, Case No. IT-04-84-R77, Order in Lieu of Indictment on
Contempt Concerning Shefqet Kabashi (Jun. 5, 2007) (former Kosovo Liberation Army member
charged with contempt of court for refusing to answer questions).
2 Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-PT, Decision on Motion to Vacate Sanctions,
2 (Feb. 23, 2005).
231

2011

The Development of the InternationalDefense Bar

435

merits of the defense position in Karemeraregarding the imposition of sanctions on
counsel, the data indicate that the imposition of actual contempt of court findings is
in practice rapidly disappearing, in part because of the increasing professionalism of
the defense. Instead, the tribunals appear reluctant, requiring a high threshold of
conduct to warrant admonishment.
2. Violation ofProtective Orders

Article 21 of the ICTR Statute 235 and Article 22 of the ICTY Statute236
provide for protective measures for witnesses and/or victims. The measures usually
require that the parties conceal the identity of testifying witnesses. These
provisions are utilized in every trial. As noted above, defense attorney Anto Nobilo
was acquitted in 2001 of allegations that he knowingly violated a protective order.237
That 2001 case is the last reported instance in the ICTY. The ad hoc tribunals have
applied a rather consistent analytical template to allegations of misconduct with the
result that no defense counsel has been held in contempt on this basis. The movant
has to make a case that the violator "knowingly and willfully" intended to disrupt
the court's administration ofjustice.2 38
It has been suggested, generally by defense counsel, that the tribunals
increase limitations on opposing party's access to witnesses by toughening the
protective orders. Specifically, parties have asked either (1) that witness identities
not be released to opposing counsel or (2) that parties be required to contact
opposing counsel before contacting or conducting interviews. The tribunals have
rejected such requests, finding that the limitations unduly constrain equality of arms
and such limitations would impinge on the rights of a party to gather information
necessary for the case. 239

235 "The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall provide in its Rules of Procedure and Evidence
for the protection of victims and witnesses. Such protection measures shall include, but shall not be
limited to, the conduct of in camera proceedings and the protection of the victim's identity." ICTR
Statute, supra note 41, art. 21.
236 "The International Tribunal shall provide in its rules of procedure and evidence for the
protection of victims and witnesses. Such protection measures shall include, but shall not be limited to,
the conduct of in camera proceedings and the protection of the victim's identity." ICTY Statute, supra
note 41, art. 22.
237 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
238 Rule 77 of both the ICTR Rules and ICTY Rules establishes the level of conduct and mens rea
needed to be held in contempt of the respective tribunals. For cases establishing the level, cf,
Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR 98-44A-T, Decision on Kajelijeli's Motion to Hold Members
of the Office of Prosecutor in Contempt of the Tribunal (Nov. 15, 2002) (court finding that Defense
failed to show that prosecution deliberately violated a witness protection order) with Prosecutor v.
Bagosora, Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Decision on Reconsideration of Order to Reduce Witness List and
on Motion for Contempt for Violation of that Order (Mar. 1, 2004) (finding that not every knowing and
willful violation results in a finding of contempt).
239 For example, in Nchamihigo, the court rejected a defense request to vary protective orders,
noting that protective orders are important to both protect witnesses and facilitate the prosecution in
conducting its own investigation. Case No. ICTR 2001-63-T, Decision on Defence Motion on
Contempt of Court and Reconsideration of Protective Measures for Defence Witnesses (Aug. 9, 2007).
See also, Prosecutor v. Nyiramashuko, (Jul. 10, 2001), where the tribunal refused the prosecution's
request that members of the defense must submit a written request on reasonable notice to the
prosecutor and trial chamber if intended to contact witnesses or members of their family.
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3. Witness intimidation and other witness improprieties

Witness intimidation is a subset of contempt. Allegations of witness
intimidation are commonly invoked both by the defense and the Prosecution. In the
twenty-one such cases examined, spanning four different jurisdictions (ICTY,
ICTR, ECCC and ICC), the argument was invoked roughly the same number of
times by the defense and the prosecution (nine times each). However, all
allegations against the Prosecution arose in ICTY litigation. A majority of the
motions alleging intimidation of witnesses concerned conduct during the pre-trial
phase (only one concerned the trial phase). Furthermore, in 100% of the cases
analyzed, the approach of the Trial Chamber is extremely specific and fact-based.
The jurisprudence illustrates a cascading approach that requires consideration of a
succession of factors in order to warrant judicial enforcement of sanctions against
counsel.
First, the evidence must demonstrate a specific threat targeted at a witness
or, by extension, the family of a witness. Allegations have to be backed up with
precise facts. In order for it to represent a justiciable threat, a certain threshold
must be reached. The mere fact that the name of the witness has been disclosed and
is thus known by the accused is not sufficient to constitute a threat.240 For instance,
a threat is characterized by interference caused by prison officials and prosecutors2 4,
or when the accused, formerly in a position of power, uses his influence.2 42 The
threat has to be focused at the witness and not a general side effect of a threatening
or potentially coercive environment. Surprisingly, perhaps, the most convictions on
this basis arose from the conduct of other witnesses rather than the actions of
counsel.
In the Lubanga case, the ICC Trial Chamber I had the opportunity to
clarify these standards even further.2 43 Recalling that the test used to determine
whether a situation constitutes a threat is eminently objective, the judges explained
that the attitude of the witness has to be taken into account. A generalized attitude
of fear by the witness, when not warranted by concrete facts, does not satisfy the
test and is thus not considered as a threat. In the Lubanga circumstances, the
witness was requesting from the judges an extended protection when there was no
cognizable specific threat. Similarly, Brahimaj (ICTY) reiterated the requirement
of a concrete danger and not just an abstract threat.2"
Demonstration of a tangible threat is, in itself, insufficient.2 45 The threat
might trigger the application of a witness protection program, but in the context of a
request for sanctions against counsel there must be a causal link between the threat
240 Prosecutor v. Staniid & Simatovid, Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision on Provisional Release,
52-56 (May 26, 2008).
241 Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR 01-76-T, Judgement and Sentence, %5 41-53 (Dec. 13,
2005).
242 Prosecutor v. BoRcoski & Tar6ulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-PT, Decision on Defence Motion of
Ljube Bo~coski for Provisional Release, T1142-43 (July 18, 2005).
243 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Ex Parte Hearing-OTP and Victims &
Witnesses Unit, p. 10-11 (Apr. 1, 2009).
2 Prosecutor v. Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Decision on Motion of Lahi Brahimaj on
Provisional Release, T 16 (Dec. 14, 2007).
245 in Prosecutor v. Lubanga, the ICC judges note that the ICTY has repeatedly decided in this
direction.
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and the counsel facing sanctions. Chambers will look at two elements in order to
determine the substance of the link. In the first place, the prior behavior of the
defendant is relevant. This factor was used in many cases before the ICTY and of
particular note in Boicoski246 where the judges took into account the fact that the
accused had formed a special police force whose members were involved in
previous cases of witness intimidation. The facts indicated that he still exercised
influence over those members. Although there was no proof that the accused would
use his influence illegally, the Court thought that the risk of witness intimidation
was too high and refused to grant provisional release.
Secondly, the courts have examined the potential and future behavior of the
accused. Again, these hearings are very fact-specific. The judicial standards
indicate that protection is in order only when the accused is expected to actually
threaten the witness or victims. Chambers have taken into account the violent
history of the accused for example. In this situation, the courts seem to lower the
likelihood of a threat. Even though there is no specific proof adduced of a pending
violent act, a likelihood of risk can be enough to prevent provisional release.247 The
simple existence of influence over the relevant personnel will be enough, even
though said influence would not have been used illegally. 248
Analysis of the available case law indicates that this species of motion is
rarely successful. Of the most relevant motions, only three were wholly successful
while one was partially granted. Roughly half of the cases do not result in contempt
findings based on the failure to meet the cascading requirements laid out in the
jurisprudence, while others are simply unsubstantiated. Though the evidentiary
standards are high, some motions were simply discounted as being fanciful or
speculative. Furthermore, it appears that a few specific groups of defense
counsel-representing groups of defendants that were tried together, at least for a
time, between 1996 and 2000-account for an inordinate number of motions.
In any event, the data in no way supports a stereotypical assumption that
defense counsel intimidate witnesses during international criminal proceedings. In
some instances, surrounding circumstances may be the definitive factor as judges
refuse requests in which the defense team made no further effort to contact the
witness in order to develop the facts surrounding the alleged intimidation.249
Similarly, some Chambers have dismissed vague allegations raised by counsel that
have previously made frivolous motions. 2 0 Thus, despite the frequency with which
these allegations arise, and the sensitivity that they require, the empirical evidence
does not support the conclusion that the international defense bar acts
unprofessionally or unethically vis-d-vis witnesses or victims. As in other areas
examined, the window from 2001-2003 appears to be the watershed that witnessed
246 Prosecutor v. Botcoski & Tardulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-PT, Decision on Defence
Motion of
Ljube Bo~coski for Provisional Realease, 1 42-43 (July 18, 2005); see also Prosecutor v. Boicoski &
Tardulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-PT, Decision Concerning Renewed Motion on Provisional Release of
Johan Tardulovski, T1 16-22 (Jan. 17, 2007).
247 Prosecutor v. Stanilid & Simatovik, Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision on Provisional Release,
11 52-56 (May 26, 2008).
248 id
249 Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Decision on Motion Concerning Alleged
Witness Intimidation, 9 (Dec. 28, 2004).
25o Prosecutor v. leng Sary, Case No. A363, Request for Information Concerning Complaints
Made by Potential Witnesses (ECCC, Mar. 1, 2010).
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the maturation of an organized and capable defense bar.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Franklin Delano Roosevelt told the American people and the assembled
Congress at the beginning of World War II that "[t]he mighty action we are calling
for cannot be based on a disregard of all things worth fighting for.""' In the context
of international justice, that truism indicates that a system of "justice" that does not
incorporate a full and vigorous defense represents only a fagade of justice. The
Milogevi6 Trial Chamber made a similar point in recognizing that "fairness is thus
the overarching requirement of criminal proceedings."'
Justice Jackson's
enduring observation that crimes are committed by men rather than abstract entities
served as the precursor for the conception of individual criminal responsibility that
has been embedded in every recent Tribunal statute. With the establishment of the
ICC, the world has now witnessed a full institutionalization of the esoteric
aspiration that Jackson voiced so eloquently during his months at Nuremberg. The
legal precepts that were so novel at the end of World War II in Nuremberg and
Tokyo are now enmeshed into an integrated and holistic legal system.
Similarly, the developmental arc of a seasoned and professionalized
international defense bar today makes it an indispensable element of the search for
international justice. Unlike the IMT era, the modern defense bar can never be
accurately portrayed as an ignoble and inconvenient afterthought. The defense and
prosecution teams continue to labor under an enduring and perhaps inevitable
imbalance both in reputation and in resources. However, the defense bar today
enjoys a refrained and enhanced status at the very center of the organizational
structures of the emerging international accountability system. Indeed, there can be
no doubt about the commitment of many defense counsel to their work; at the time
of this writing, at least two ICTR defense attorneys have been killed, in part
because of their advocacy on behalf of accused. 25 3 As the ICTY Appeals Chamber
wrote in Tadie, while equality of arms requires both parties to have the "same
access to the powers of the court and the same right to present their cases . .. the
principle does not call for equalizing the material and practical circumstances of the
two parties."254 While an absolute and objective equality of arms is perhaps a
structural impossibility given the political and economic realities of our world, a
mature and engaged international criminal defense bar has achieved its functional
equivalent.
The growth of a systematic international justice system is necessarily
paralleled by the development of a defense bar that serves to ensure that every
judgment of a defendant's culpability or innocence is grounded in the soil of
251 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, The Four Freedoms, Address Before
the U.S. House of
Representatives (Jan. 6, 1941), in GREAT AMERICAN SPEECHES 161, 164 (Gregory R. Shapiro ed.,
1993).
252 Prosecutor v. Milotevid, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on the Prosecution
Motion Concerning Assignment of Counsel, T 29 (Sept. 22, 2004).
253 Josh Kron, Tanzania: Tribunal Lawyer Killed, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 15, 2010, at A6 (reporting that
defense attorney Jwani Mwaikusa was shot in front of his Dar es Salaam home along with his nephew
and neighbor and that documents were stolen from his car).
254 Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 1 37 (15 Jul. 1999).
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individual responsibility rather than irrational prejudice or irresponsible collective
guilt. By extension, the micro efforts of the defense bar to challenge the minutiae
of evidence and vive voce testimony during the often tedious and lengthy days of
trial provide the necessary counterbalance to the relentless press of the media and
the press to forget the past and move toward an unknown future. A mature and
professionalized defense bar allows the world to know the individualized history of
every defendant. The constellation of cases that fills the jurisprudential firmament
would not exist without the dedication and diligence of the modem defense bar.
Just as the individual cases only take on their full significance in relation to each
other, so too does the work of the defense bar form and shape that of the Chambers
and the prosecution.

